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ABSTRACT
The religious nature of “In God we trust” is clear from the text and its history. The Baptist minister who first
proposed a religious motto suggested “the recognition of the Almighty God in some form in our coins” would
“relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism.” Both a McCarthy-era expansion and proposed diminutions under
Theodore Roosevelt and George W. Bush confirm the religious nature of the motto.
Courts have sought a secular legislative purpose for “In God we trust,” suggesting it formalizes our medium of
exchange, fosters patriotism, expresses confidence in the future, encourages recognition of what is worthy, and
celebrates our religious heritage. Such post hoc secular rationales are unsupported by the historical record.
When first proposed, it was said the religious motto “would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen
could object.” But America has become a strikingly diverse society on matters of religious belief. Almost a third of
our citizens profess non-Christian faiths or identify as atheists, agnostics, or nothing in particular. The religious
motto is disrespectful of them.
To test the secular legislative purposes identified by the courts, the article concludes by proposing that “In God we
trust” be replaced on some coins with mottos which truly reflect our diverse religious heritage.
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I wish as well as every body else to be perfectly happy, but like every body else it
must be in my own way.
—Jane Austen, Sense and Sensibility1

INTRODUCTION
Many Americans would no doubt be surprised to learn that we have a
national march, tree, and flower.2 Federal law proclaims The Stars and Stripes

1
2

JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 135 (Patricia Meyer Spacks ed., Harvard Univ. Press 2013)
(1811).
36 U.S.C. §§ 301–05 (2012) (designating, respectively, our national anthem, motto, floral emblem,
march, and tree).
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Forever our national march,3 the oak our national tree,4 and the rose our “national floral emblem.”5 Apart from questions about the reasoning behind
such designations,6 the statutory choices seem not terribly controversial.7
Not so the statutory designation of “In God we trust” as our national motto.8
For our national motto is both ubiquitous and increasingly divisive. It is ubiquitous because it has appeared on American coins since 1864,9 and since 1955
has been required by statute to be emblazoned on every bill and coin.10 In
Fiscal Year 2015 alone, the United States produced in excess of twenty-three
billion circulating notes and coins, every one of which affirmed In God we trust.11
It is increasingly divisive because, although its sentiment was once perhaps
nearly uniformly held among our citizens, it is no longer. A significant and
growing number of Americans do not place their trust in God, or place their
trust in a god, or gods, other than the Christian God of the national motto.
The following discussion considers both the constitutionality and the wisdom of having In God we trust on our currency. We trace the history of having

3

4
5
6

7

8
9
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11

36 U.S.C. § 304 (2012) (providing that “[t]he composition by John Philip Sousa entitled ‘The Stars
and Stripes Forever’ is the national march”). The national march is not to be confused with the
national anthem, which the same chapter designates as the Star-Spangled Banner. 36 U.S.C. § 301
(2012).
36 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (providing that “[t]he tree genus Quercus, commonly known as the oak
tree, is the national tree”).
36 U.S.C. § 303 (2012) (providing that “[t]he flower commonly known as the rose is the national
floral emblem”).
The designations leave some questions unanswered. Is the Union really made more perfect by
having a national tree? Why do we have a national floral emblem and not a national bird, a national march but not a national polka?
Although Glenn Miller’s swing classic St. Louis Blues March would be a much better national march.
See MsCatreona, Glenn Miller and the Army Air Corps Orchestra: “The St. Louis Blues March,” YOUTUBE
(July 10, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dmbflslh-js.
36 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (providing that “‘In God we trust’ is the national motto”).
U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE MINT, 1896 SEC’Y OF THE
TREASURY ANN. REP. ON THE STATE OF THE FINANCES app. at 260–61 (1897), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/treasar/AR_TREASURY_1896.pdf [hereinafter 1896
REPORT] (explaining that “the first suggestion of the recognition of the Deity on the coins of the
United States was contained in a letter” from a Pennsylvania minister to Secretary of the Treasury
Salmon P . Chase in 1861, and the suggestion was put into effect in 1864 “with the motto ‘In God
we trust’”); History of “In God We Trust,” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/education/pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx. The text of the minister’s letter mentioned
in these accounts is reproduced in Appendix A.
Act of July 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5114
(2012)) (providing that “all United States currency shall bear the inscription ‘In God We Trust’”).
In Fiscal Year (“FY”) 2015, the United States Mint produced 16.2 billion circulating coins. Matthew
Rhett Jeppson, Principal Deputy Director’s Letter, 2015 U.S. MINT ANN. REP. 1, 1, https://www.usmint.gov/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2015AnnualReport.pdf. In FY 2015, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing produced over seven billion regular notes. U.S. Department of the
Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, Monthly Production Reports, MONEY FACTOR,
https://www.moneyfactory.gov/resources/productionannual.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (reporting that 7,033,400,000 bills were printed in FY 2015).
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the motto on our currency, then the constitutionality of the practice. We then
briefly review modern changes in the religious affiliations of Americans, and
consider two reform options that would make the composition of our currency
both constitutional and respectful of all our citizens. One would chart a new
direction for our currency that would implement the religious heritage rationale of the courts in a way that truly reflects the history and diversity of the
nation on matters religious. The other would eliminate the problem. We
close by discussing how having In God we trust on our currency is part of a
broader question of how we should respond to our growing religious diversity.
I. “THIS WOULD RELIEVE US FROM THE IGNOMINY OF HEATHENISM”:
THE HISTORY OF IN GOD WE TRUST ON OUR CURRENCY
In this Part, we look at four episodes during which the placement of In God
we trust on our currency was at issue: the original decision during the Rebellion
to place the motto on some coins, the First Omission when the motto was
removed from some coins during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt,
the expansion of the motto on our currency during the McCarthy era, and
the Second Omission when the motto was diminished on some coins and mistakenly omitted from others during the administration of George W. Bush.
A. Origins During the Rebellion
During the first year of the Rebellion, shortly after the Union defeat at
the Battle of Ball’s Bluff, a Baptist minister from Pennsylvania, Reverend
Mark R. Watkinson, wrote Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase to suggest
“the recognition of the Almighty God in some form in our coins.”12 He explained the rationale for his request: “You are probably a Christian. What
if our Republic were now shattered beyond reconstruction? Would not the
antiquaries of succeeding centuries rightly reason from our past that we were
a heathen nation?”13 Having suggested a coin design with the motto “God,
liberty, law,” Reverend Watkinson concluded:
This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen could object.
This would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism. This would place
us openly under the Divine protection we have personally claimed. From
my heart I have felt our national shame in disowning God as not the least of
our present national disasters.14

Secretary Chase acted upon Reverend Watkinson’s suggestion regarding
the recognition of God. The Secretary wrote James Pollock, the Director of the

12
13
14

1896 REPORT, supra note 9, at 260.
Id.
Id. at 260–61.
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Mint, affirming his belief that “[n]o nation can be strong except in the strength
of God, or safe except in His defense,” and his conclusion that “[t]he trust of
our people in God should be declared on our national coins.”15 He ordered the
Director of the Mint to implement Reverend Watkinson’s suggestion: “You will
cause a device to be prepared without unnecessary delay with a motto expressing in the fewest and tersest words possible this national recognition.”16
Secretary Chase’s directive could not have gone to a more cooperative
individual. Prior to being named the director of the Philadelphia Mint,
James Pollock served as a judge, a member of Congress, and Governor of
Pennsylvania. A religious man, he served for thirty-five years as the vice
president of the American Sunday-School Union.17 He was described as “an
exemplary Christian worker”; reference was made to “[h]is sterling integrity
and Christian patriotism.”18 Of him it was said: “He was always eager to do
the Lord’s business, with earnestness and dispatch . . . .”19 Pollock believed
in a national Christianity, as described in a speech he delivered in 1855:
Citizens of America: Have you ever stopped to think where you are, what
you have been, and what is your destiny? There is a national Christianity, . . . an American conscience, a great American heart; that heart, that
conscience must be touched, must be enlightened with the glorious truths of
the Bible ere they can feel and realize and know the responsibilities they owe
to their country . . . .20

Pollock’s brand of national Christianity led him to membership in the National Reform Association.21 During the Rebellion the National Reform Association brought together Christian citizens of a certain orientation, whose
goal was to amend the Constitution to acknowledge God’s divine authority.
Their proposed amendment would have changed the Preamble to read:
We, the People of the United States [recognizing the being and attributes of Almighty
God, the Divine Authority of the Holy Scriptures, the law of God as paramount rule, and
Jesus, the Messiah, the Savior and Lord of all], in order to form a more perfect
union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and to our posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.22

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Id. at 261. Reproduced at Appendix B.
Id.
EDWIN WILBUR RICE, THE SUNDAY-SCHOOL MOVEMENT AND THE AMERICAN SUNDAYSCHOOL UNION 177 (1917).
Id. at 177–78.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 178.
Martin Gruberg, In God We Trust, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA 486,
487 (David Schultz & John R. Vile eds., Routledge 2015) (2005).
Gary DeMar, The National Reform Association, AM. VISION (Sept. 16, 2009) (alteration in original),
https://americanvision.org/3026/the-national-reform-association/ (bracketing and italicizing
proposed additions).
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The Association intended that its constitutional amendment set a uniform
national religion. One proponent made the analogy that as “Constitutional
laws punish for false money, weights and measures, and of course Congress
establishes a standard for money, weights and measures, so Congress must
establish a standard of religion.”23 The constitutional amendment proposed
by the Association was intended to exclude non-believers, with one advocate
asserting that “the existence of a Christian Constitution would disfranchise
every logically consistent infidel.”24
Having received the Secretary’s instructions as to the recognition of God
on the nation’s coins, Director Pollock “carried out [Chase’s] directive without delay”25:
[H]e arranged for the striking of pattern half dollars and eagles ($10 gold
pieces) bearing that date. . . . The pattern half dollars were identical in design to the Liberty Seated halves then being issued for commerce—except
for the addition of the motto “God Our Trust” above the eagle on the reverse. . . . The pattern $10 coins . . . had the same Liberty Head design as
regular $10 gold pieces of that time, but the words “God Our Trust” appeared in the field above the eagle on the reverse.26

The process continued: “In December, 1863, the Director of the Mint submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for approval designs for new 1, 2, and
3 cent pieces, on which it was proposed that one of the following mottoes
should appear: ‘Our country; our God;’ ‘God, our Trust.’”27
Secretary Chase responded by letter to Director Pollock on December 9,
1863, approving the suggested language with changes: “I approve your mottoes, only suggesting that on that with the Washington obverse the motto should
begin with the word ‘Our,’ so as to read: ‘Our God and our country.’ And on
that with the shield, it should be changed so as to read: ‘In God we trust.’”28

23
24

25

26
27
28

LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 241 (rev. ed., 1967) (1953).
Id. As Pfeffer chronicles it:
The historian of the National Reform Movement suggested that if the Christian amendment were adopted, those who “do not see fit to fall in with the majority . . . must abide
the consequences, or seek some more congenial clime.” But another man of God was
somewhat less subtle in indicating the shortest way with dissenters. If, he said, “the opponents of the Bible do not like our government and its Christian features, let them go to
some wild, desolate land, and in the name of the devil, and for the sake of the devil, subdue
it, and set up a government of their own on infidel and atheistic ideas; and if they can stand
it, stay there till they die.”
Id. at 241–42.
Mike Fuljenz, “In God We Trust”—The Story of Our National Motto, SETINVESTIGATES.COM (Dec. 31,
2012, 12:00 AM) http://setinvestigates.com/in-god-we-trust-the-story-of-our-national-mottop338-111.htm.
Id.
1896 REPORT, supra note 9, at 261.
Id.
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The necessary legislation passed Congress on April 22, 1864, and the 2cent bronze coin became the first upon which In God we trust appeared.29 The
following year Congress passed an authorization for the Director of the Mint,
with the approval of the Treasury Secretary, to put the motto on any gold
and silver coins of the United States where it would fit.30 The permission was
repeated in the coinage act of February 12, 1873.31
The motto In God we trust was first placed on coins during the Rebellion
to provide evidence of the Christian, God-fearing qualities of the American
people.32 Once the nation was relieved from the ignominy of heathenism by
the placement of In God we trust on some American coins, the matter rested
for four decades until the First Omission, during the administration of Theodore Roosevelt, to which we now turn.
B. Theodore Roosevelt and the First Omission
President Theodore Roosevelt became embroiled in controversy over In
God we trust because he wanted a dramatic redesign of our coinage.33 In early
1905, he arranged for sculptor Augustus Saint-Gaudens to design new $10
and $20 gold coins.34 The President was involved in the design of the coins,
and directed that In God we trust not be included in the design,35 a request with
which Saint-Gaudens complied.36
When Saint-Gaudens’ work was made public, the absence of In God we
trust caused a public outcry.37 For example, after a protracted and tumultuous debate, one mainstream religious denomination took a decisive stand:
29
30
31
32

33
34
35

36
37

Id.
Id.
Id.; see also CONG. GLOBE, 42nd Cong., 3d Sess. 672 (1873).
This was confirmed in a 1908 speech by Congressman Charles C. Carlin of Virginia to the House:
I believe that the world already understands that we are a Christian, God-fearing, Godloving people, and it was not necessary to emphasize this fact by the statute which originally allowed this motto to be placed upon our coins. But it was done at a time when civil
war was upon us; when the hand of brother was turned against brother; when the minds
of men were enraged, and the settlement of problems was submitted to the arbitrament of
arms, the result of which no man could at that time foretell. . . .
It was at this time, viz., November, 1861, that a Pennsylvania minister advised the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Salmon P. Chase, “that this nation might perish and that there
should be some evidence of the religious faith of its inhabitants preserved upon its coins.”
42 CONG. REC. 3384 (1908) (statement of Rep. Carlin).
Q. David Bowers, Notes on the 1907 Saint-Gaudens $10 with Periods, Wire Rim, USPATTERNS.COM (Apr.
13, 2001), http://uspatterns.com/j1774p19951.html.
Id.
Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust’: President Says Such a Motto on Coin Is Irreverence, Close to Sacrilege, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1907, at 1, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9406E2D81
03EE033A25757C1A9679D946697D6CF. Reproduced in Appendix C.
Bowers, supra note 33.
Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust,’ supra note 35 (“[N]umerous protests . . . have been received at
the White House against the new gold coin which have [sic] been coined without the words ‘In

252

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:2

After a red-hot debate the Episcopal Diocesan Convention . . . yesterday, by
a vote of 131 to 81, passed resolutions protesting against the elimination of
the motto, “In God We Trust,” from the new ten-dollar gold pieces. The
debate on the question lasted an hour and a half, and for a part of that time
the convention was in some disorder.38

The Episcopalians protested against the omission and declared “that the
highest interest of our country demands the preservation of all those customs
that have stood for the recognition of God in the life of the people.”39
President Roosevelt issued a letter outlining his position.40 He noted that
there was no legal requirement that In God we trust be on coins, that he “did
not approve of it,” and that he “did not direct that it should again be put
on.”41 President Roosevelt’s position was not based on a disagreement with
the sentiment or from feeling that the motto was inappropriate for government display, far from it:
It is a motto which is, indeed, well to have inscribed on our great National
monuments, in our temples of justice, in our legislative halls, and in buildings
such as those at West Point and Annapolis—in short, wherever it will tend
to arouse and inspire a lofty emotion in those who look thereon.42

The President described the motto as “[a] beautiful and solemn sentence . . . [that] should be treated and uttered only with that fine reverence
which necessarily implies a certain exaltation of spirit.”43 The use of the
motto on coins, Roosevelt declared, bordered on sacrilege: “My own feeling
in the matter is due to my very firm conviction that to put such a motto on
coins, or to use it in any kindred manner, not only does no good, but does

38

39
40
41
42
43

God We Trust’ . . . .”). Controversy over Saint-Gaudens’ designs was not limited to the omission
of In God we trust. The $10 design was criticized when it was alleged that the model for the female
figure on the obverse, Mary Cunningham, was not American-born. The Order of Independent
Americans, “admitting her rare beauty, object[ed] because she was born in Ireland.” Bowers, supra
note 33. Another rumor asserted that the model was “said to have been taken from the portrait of
his mistress, Davida Clark, with whom he is alleged to have had a child (although biographers have
never been able to confirm this).” Id.
Denounce Coin Motto Order: Episcopal Convention Votes, 131 to 81, to Retain “In God We Trust,” N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 1907, at 1, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9406E2D8103EE033A25757C1A9679D946697D6CF. It does not appear that opposition within the convention to the
resolution of condemnation was based on any question about the propriety of linking the federal
government and Christianity. One opponent, Dr. Gustav Carstensen, opposed the resolution because it gave a misleading inference about the religious faith of the nation: “I think this effort is a
mistake and misleading in the inference that we go as a nation back into apostasy. Our godliness
is not shown in this . . . .” Id. Another opponent, Dr. Loring W. Batten, opposed the resolution,
and the inclusion of the motto on currency, on Biblical grounds: “Dr. Batten admitted that the
spirit of the resolution was good. . . . ‘It looks to me . . . as if this motto were upon the coins against
the express command: “You cannot worship God and Mammon.”’” Id.
Id.
Roosevelt Dropped “In God We Trust”, supra note 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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positive harm, and is in effect irreverence, which comes dangerously close to
sacrilege.”44 President Roosevelt was worried that the use of In God we trust
on coins would be akin to its use in advertisements, and would debase it:
Any use which tends to cheapen it, and, above all, any use which tends to
secure its being treated in a spirit of levity, is from every standpoint profoundly to be regretted. . . . But it seems to me eminently unwise to cheapen
such a motto by use on coins, just as it would be to cheapen it by use on
postage stamps or in advertisements.45

Indeed, he cited his own experiences:
I have never heard any human being speak reverently of this motto on the
coins or show any signs of its having appealed to any high emotion in him,
but I have literally, hundreds of times, heard it used as an occasion of and
incitement to the sneering ridicule which it is, above all things, undesirable
that so beautiful and exalted a phrase should excite.46

The President allowed that the question was “absolutely in the hands of
Congress,” and promised that “any direction of Congress in the matter will
be immediately obeyed.”47 But, he concluded his letter, “I very earnestly
trust that the religious sentiment of the country, the spirit of reverence in the
country, will prevent any such action being taken.”48
Clearly, Congress did not share the President’s analysis that the inclusion of
In God we trust on coins was sacrilegious. On January 7, 1908, the matter was
addressed in the House. Congressman Morris Sheppard of Texas spoke of the
motto In God we trust in religious terms, characterizing it as “this striking sentence
so expressive of American reverence and faith.”49 Asserting that “God is the
source of liberty and religious freedom the basis of political independence,” he
observed that the “American people are fundamentally a religious people,”50
and then proceeded to describe a citizenry unified on matters religious:
Perhaps every form of religious thought is represented among us and yet we
are one in the recognition of a supreme and all-wise God. The opportunity to
worship the omnipotent Father according to the conscience of the individual
is the basis of American history, the corner-stone of the American Commonwealth. There is an essential relation between God and freedom. Liberty as
44
45
46

47
48
49
50

Id.
Id.
Id. President Roosevelt cited examples of such jokes, the humor of which may escape modern
audiences, unaccustomed as we are to free-silver humor:
For example, throughout the long contest extending over several decades on the free coinage question, the existence of this motto on the coins was a constant source of jest and ridicule, and this was unavoidable. Every one must remember the innumerable cartoons and
articles based on phrases like “In God we trust for the 8 cents,” “In God we trust for the
short weight,” “In God we trust for the 37 cents we do not pay,” and so forth and so forth.
Id.
Id.
Id.
42 CONG. REC. 511 (1908) (statement of Rep. Sheppard).
Id.
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a permanent prerogative of the people was for all practical purposes an impossible conception before Abraham’s proclamation of the one all-seeing God.51

He traced the role of God in the democratization of the world:
[M]en who had worshipped kings and idols came soon to realize that the
God of the spirit was the only rightful sovereign. They came soon to understand that with the same spiritual Father men were brothers both here and
hereafter. It followed immediately that men were spiritual and political
equals, and liberty, equality, fraternity, dawned upon the human race.52

Following this, he traced the hand of God in the founding and history of the
United States:
The beginnings of the United States were essentially religious, and a divine
purpose may be seen in the events which made possible our country and its
institutions. Surely there was omnipotent design in the fact that the invention of printing, the discovery of America, and the European Reformation
took place within the same century. . . . Thus under the especial favor of
Providence America began. . . . [T]he finger of God may be traced in every
crisis of American history and that the dominant note of American character
has been an unfaltering trust in the wisdom and justice of Omnipotence.53

Indeed, Congressman Sheppard concluded,
[T]he hosts of earth’s exiled and earth’s wronged—flourished here under
difficulties so tremendous, such pestilences, famines, massacres, and dissensions, that their preservation and advancement can be attributed to no other
source than the God whose worship they came to maintain in its original
purity, whose freedom they were to transmit to posterity and eternity.54

Following his protracted historical exegesis, Congressman Sheppard
turned to whether the motto In God we trust should be returned to the nation’s
currency. He cast his argument in religious terms:
It is particularly appropriate that the inscription “In God we trust” should
appear upon our national moneys. The coinage of a country is the most concrete and universal evidence of its sovereignty. Is it not fitting that this most
elemental expression of government should contain a recognition of the
power to which the Government owes its foundation, its growth, its
glory . . . ? I believe . . . that the beautiful and stately sentence “In God we
trust,” so symbolic of American history, American aspiration, American faith,
should be permanently inscribed upon the coinage of the United States.55

To bolster his case, Congressman Sheppard appended in the record a
selection of editorials and letters from the Christian Herald. The editorial position of the paper was that it was sacrilegious to remove the motto, an impious falsification of history to remove the recognition due God.56 The letters

51
52
53
54
55
56

Id.
Id.
Id. at 512 (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record).
Id. (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record).
Id. at 513 (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record).
Editorial, Let Congress Restore It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1116 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC.
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reproduced at Congressman Sheppard’s behest were also religious in tone,
including declarations that America was a Christian nation, such as the one
that asked what the motto would mean to future generations: “Congress
should restore the motto on our national coins as the motto of all our basic
laws. Historians of future centuries would then know beyond doubt that
those coins represented a Christian nation which trusted in God, notwithstanding the skeptic’s opinion.”57
Another range of letters cast the inclusion of the motto on coins as a
means of praising God for blessing this, his beloved country, such as the one
that stated that God wanted the recognition: “The motto is an expression of
honor, gratitude, and love from the American nation to the God who made
them free. The God of love wants public expression from His people that
the world may see and profit by it, and He honors any opportunity taken to
acknowledge Him.”58

57

58

513 app. A. at 513 (1908) (“[A] great wrong has been committed in sacrilegiously removing the
words which imply national recognition of God’s protecting care over our land and people and that
dishonor has been done to the memories of those noble men who, in a time of severe national stress
and trial, place the motto on our coinage. . . . Let us see to it that we do not falsify history by impiously effacing from our coinage the recognition due to Him to whom we owe all our national greatness, happiness, and prosperity.”).
F. S. Cushion, Letter to the Editor, Congress Should Restore It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907),
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908); see also B. L. Turner, Letter to the Editor,
Cling to the Motto, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at
514 (1908) (“If we, as a Christian nation, allow the removal of our motto, “In God we trust,” from
our coins on account of ridicule and irreverence, we disown God . . . . Can our nation afford to do
this?”); E. B. Stark, Letter to the Editor, We Need God’s Help Always, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124
(1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“We are a Christian nation, but
there is much to alarm us. . . . There is so much lawlessness and ungodliness that we need all the
help and the recognition of our God to sustain us in our perils.”); G. W. Walker, Letter to the
Editor, Let Congress Restore It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513
app. A. at 514 (1908) (“Am now nearing the four-score mark, but hope and pray, ere God calls me
home, to see this motto replaced on our coins, thus acknowledging God who has kept us and manifesting to the world that we are a Christian people.”); Chauncey N. Pond, Letter to the Editor,
Should Be Instantly Replaced, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513
app. A. at 515 (1908) (“While absolutely nonsectarian, it expresses the deep, unwavering faith of
the vast mass of our people. Its removal shocks the moral sense of the nation, and nothing less than
its prompt and full restoration will satisfy the conscience of this Christian land.”); E. Francis, Letter
to the Editor, Don’t Haul Down the Banner, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted in 42
CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908) (“The removal of the motto shows an evidence of weakness
and a catering to the adversary on the part of the authorities in power. So long as we claim to be
a Christian nation, Christian mottoes should dominate its citizens. When a professedly Christian
nation obliterates its Christian motto it permits or licenses the banner of truth to be hauled down
and trampled under the feet of men.” ); W. C. Oliver, Letter to the Editor, A Blow at Christian Sentiment, CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908)
(“The motto has adorned our coin for many years; and if left off now, the effect will certainly not
aid or increase Christian sentiment, but rather the reverse. We should trust God in all things. Why,
then, is the motto out of place on our coins when we claim to be a Christian nation?”).
Ada F. Button, Letter to the Editor, Let the Motto Stand, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted
in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) ; see also Elbridge G. Stout, Letter to the Editor, This Is

256

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:2

Another group asserted that the motto represented the religious faith of
the nation, such as the one that characterized the motto as “a sermon in itself”: “We should keep the sacred motto, ‘In God we trust,’ on all our national
coinage, because it is a sermon in itself and shows to the world that we as a
nation believe in one God and recognize Him in our very commercial life.”59
Others asserted that removing the motto from coins constituted blasphemy
or a lack of reverence, such as the one that asked how to characterize the President’s action: “The Government of the United States has for many years proclaimed to the world that ‘In God we trust,’ but now she backs down; takes it
all back. We trust in God no longer. If that is not blasphemy, what is it?”60
A number of the letters cast the question over the inclusion of the motto
on coins as a battle between the forces of God and God’s opponents, such as
the letter exhorting the faithful: “Let us nail our colors to the masthead and
go on to either defeat or victory, with our banners flying and with our trust
in the living God emblazoned upon our coinage!”61

59

60

61

“God’s Country,” 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 513
(1908) (“As this is God’s beloved country, the words should certainly be retained along with the American eagle.”); S. A. D. H., Letter to the Editor, God the Nation’s Strength, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124
(1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 513 (1908) (“Who but God has been our strength
and stay and made us the nation we are to-day? Praise and honor to His holy name.”).
J. M. Stoner, Letter to the Editor, A Dangerous Step, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted
in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908); see also Minna O. Brand, Letter to the Editor, The
Nation Should Trust in God, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513
app. A. at 513 (1908) (“It inspired us to know that we, as a nation, trusted in God, and were not
ashamed to admit it. May we continue to trust in God as a little child would trust its mother.”);
Charles B. Thompson, Letter to the Editor, It Expresses the Nation’s Faith, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD
1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“A motto expressive of patriotism has no more right upon our coins than one expressive of the faith without which a nation
would presently find itself in the dust. Old Glory is not too good for everyday use; neither is the
grand old motto, which has so long publicly expressed the highest faith of the great American people.”); Julia Billings, Letter to the Editor, A Strong Protest Urged, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907),
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908) (“Let us hope that a strong protest on the
part of our people may assure the continued imprint of a sentiment which acknowledges faith in
the Almighty.”).
E. R. Reed, Letter to the Editor, Is It Blasphemy?, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as reprinted
in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908); see also N. W. Merrill, Letter to the Editor, Like the
Atheism of France in 1790, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513
app. A. at 513 (1908) (“No Christian . . . can possibly object to the stamping of that dear name and
motto for which their fathers suffered so much. I never dreamed that President Roosevelt would
sanction such a want of reverence.”).
Elizabeth A. Reed, Letter to the Editor, Keep the Banner Flying, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907),
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908); see also W. T. Lone, Letter to the Editor, “God
Forbid,” 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908)
(“There are only two great leaders in the world, Christ and the devil. . . . Which of these desires the
motto on our coins to remain, and which wants it erased?”); E. M. Sapp, Letter to the Editor, Will
the Bible Be Dropped Next?, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app.
A. at 514 (1908) (“The dropping of the motto must have its root very near the borders of atheism;
the next step may be the dropping of the Bible, as in the time of the French revolution.” ); Paul
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Among the most memorable expressions reproduced from the Christian
Herald by Congressman Sheppard were four works of poetry, more or less.
One asked that God not be insulted and set aside by removing the motto
from coinage,62 another asked if America was not still a Christian nation,63
and the third characterized American currency with the motto as “God’s
own coin.”64 Surely the best poem cited by Congressman Sheppard was both
the shortest and the only one which was secular in tone: “Let all the people
together join / And keep the motto on the coin.”65
Congressman Henry S. Boutell of Illinois spoke briefly against restoration
of the motto to the nation’s coinage.66 He began by conceding “that in every
fit and appropriate way the American people should show to the world that we
are a God-fearing people.”67 He merely felt, with President Roosevelt, that
putting the motto on coins was not the appropriate way in which to profess our
national religious views. For authority, Congressman Boutell concluded by
reading from the Bible, specifically from the twenty-second chapter of the Book
of Matthew, concluding with the injunction to “[r]ender therefore unto Caesar
the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the things that are God’s.”68
On March 16, 1908, the matter came back before the House. Representative Charles C. Carlin of Virginia spoke on behalf of the subcommittee

62

63

64

65
66
67
68

Grabill, Letter to Editor, They Stand for Our Highest Ideal, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907), as
reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“If removed, what a lever it will put into the
hands of the atheist!”).
See B. L. Turner, Letter to the Editor, Cling to the Motto, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as
reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“Cling to our motto, ‘In God we trust,’ / This
for our nation surely is just. / God is our leader, He is our Guide, / Do not insult and set Him
aside.”).
A. R. P., Letter to the Editor, Put Back the Motto, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907), as reprinted in
42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“Shall we not have the motto still, / These words, ‘In
God we trust,’ / Upon our gold and silver coins? / Yes keep it there we must. / Our God has fought
our battles well, / Kept us through good and ill; / Has given us peace and plenty, too; / Can we not
trust Him still? / Are we a Christian nation yet, / And fear the truth to own? / ‘In God we trust,’ oh,
let that fact / In every land be known. / Put back the motto on our coin, / And let us keep it
there; / And as a nation by our deeds, / Its truthfulness declare.”).
Theodore Low, Letter to the Editor, Restore the Words, 30 , at 1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG.
REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908) (“‘In God we trust.’ Most woeful day / When ceases thus our land
to pray. / Restore the words you took away / From off our coins—brook no delay. / No matter what
the scoffers say, / ‘In God we trust’—no better way. / Then lift us high, don’t drag us down, / And
with the stars let’s wear the crown. / ‘In God we trust’—let’s pass it on / Each time we trade with
God’s own coin. / Let’s raise the standard to the throne, / On coin, in life, the Lord to own.”).
John Owen, Letter to the Editor, How an Immigrant Views It, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124 (1907),
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (1908).
42 CONG. REC. 516 (1908) (statement of Rep. Boutell).
Id.
Id. (quoting Matthew 22:21).
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from which H.R. 17296 emerged. He explained the rationale for the measure: “This action upon the part of the committee furnishes a lesson to the
country and the world to the effect that this is a Christian nation . . . .”69
Congressman Carlin sought to justify the expression of religious faith in
the motto In God we trust by demonstrating that the United States was not the
first nation to proclaim its religious faith through the use of a motto: “We can
not claim any unique distinction for having pointed, by the use of a motto,
to the faith of our fathers. We were not the first nation to adopt a motto
emphasizing its religious faith or belief . . . .”70
He then placed the United States in the history of such national professions of religious faith or belief, starting with Constantine and Rome in A.D.
312 and continuing with the Byzantine Empire, the Hebrews, the Arabs,
England, Scotland, France, Portugal, Russia, Switzerland, Bavaria, Brunswick, Luneburg, Prussia, Saxony, Austria, Hungary, India, Belgium, Naples,
Sicily, Italy, Denmark, and Brazil.71 Looking at examples of nations which
“represented upon [their] coins [their] faith in the Supreme Ruler of the
Universe,” and coins as “a medium of giving expression to religious belief,”
the Congressman turned his attention to “evidence of religious faith upon
the coins in America,” and found pre-Revolutionary examples from the colonies of New Jersey, Carolina, New England, Louisiana, and Virginia.72 Before turning his attention to the placement of the motto on coins during the
Rebellion, Congressman Carlin noted the example of Utah, which placed
the inscription “Holiness to the Lord” on gold pieces it issued in 1849, as a
reference “to the existence of an Omnipotent Being.”73
Congressman Carlin began to conclude his plea for return of the motto
with a statement regarding the underlying religious message of that inscription:
In every Christian heart there beats the hope that you will by your action determine that the circulating coin of this country shall carry the knowledge that
we are a Christian people; that we believe that, however strong men grow,
however powerful nations may become, there is a just, merciful, and eternal
God, in whom the civilized world can faithfully and implicitly put its trust.74

He concluded by linking the motto with Christian triumphalism:
Mr. Chairman, we are a united people; civil war and strife are forever banished from our land; eternal peace on earth and good will toward men is the
hope of every patriotic citizen. This is and will be as long as we are firm and
steadfast in the teachings of the God of Israel, and I entertain the hope and
belief that before the world has seen another century, Christian thought and
69
70
71
72
73
74

Id. at 3384 (statement of Rep. Carlin).
Id.
Id. at 3384–85.
Id. at 3385.
Id.
Id.
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Christian ideals will control the hearts and minds of all men and upon the
wall of every home throughout the universe there will hang, for the enlightenment and encouragement of all who may follow, the sacred motto, “In
God we trust.”75

Congressman Carlin was followed by Congressman Ollie M. James of
Kentucky, who announced that “the Christian legions of this nation will hail
with delight favorable action upon this bill.”76 He tied the inscription of the
motto on currency to missionary efforts abroad:
This country is not only a Christian nation, but we are engaged in sending
to foreign countries and to distant people our missionaries to preach the religions of Jesus Christ, and we want our money so that when this gold that
you say is so good goes across the ocean and is held in the hands of those
who do not know of the existence of the Saviour of the world, we can say:
“Here are the dollars of the greatest nation on earth, one that does not put
its trust in floating navies or in marching armies but places its trust in God.”77

Congressman J. Hampton Moore of Pennsylvania cast the return of the
motto to our coinage as a victory in the struggle between believers and nonbelievers. He started with a description of what followed from the removal
of the motto and the introduction of the bills to restore it:
Men have been emboldened to write in defiance of all religious sentiment.
They have hailed the removal of the motto as a revolt against the wholesome
teachings of the ages. This we should not tolerate. . . . [W]hen such a challenge is put forth, a challenge that enters into every home and fireside, which
confronts you and me as we go into our closet in secret to perform that one
act of humility which makes worth in man, then I feel it is time to rise and
declare, even by law, that this is a God-fearing nation, and that Congress
can do no harm in making that declaration emphatic. . . . [W]hat harm can
we possibly do by acknowledging to the world that God has a place in our
institutions? It can hurt none; it will console and comfort many.78

Congressman Sheppard returned to the House floor to speak of the religious conflict bound up in the status of the motto:
I desire merely to call attention to the fact that almost every infidel in the
country has openly rejoiced over the removal of this motto. Frequently Congress has been flooded with circulars from infidel societies, protesting against
the restoration of this legend. . . . The fact that the infidels openly object to
their restoration, the fact that their removal would be used as an argument
to destroy reverence rather than to inculcate it, ought to prompt Congress
unanimously to restore the words, “In God we trust.”79

75
76
77
78
79

Id. (preceding a note of “[Loud applause.]” in the record).
Id. (statement of Rep. James).
Id. (preceding a note of “[Loud applause.]” in the record).
Id. at 3386 (statement of Rep. Moore) (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record).
Id. at 3386–87 (statement of Rep. Sheppard) (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record).
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Congressman Charles G. Edwards of Georgia took up the theme of religious
conflict, first allowing that he, unlike others, did not believe that President Roosevelt was “an infidel.”80 He did, however, cast the conflict in terms of infidelity:
That infidels all over the country openly rejoiced in the fact that the word
“God” was stricken from our money is now a well-known fact. Certain societies, known to be infidelic, have been protesting by mail to Congressmen
and Senators against the restoration of this sentence. The removal of this
sentence from our coin did not depreciate its monetary value, but it depreciated its sentimental value. The removal of these words was a victory for
infidelity. The restoration of them to our coin will be a blow to infidelity and
a victory for the God-fearing people of this great nation.81

Notwithstanding the infidels who did not favor returning the motto to coins,
Congressman Edwards was clear that the nation was unified behind his position:
This is no sectarian question. The Methodist, the Baptist, the Presbyterian,
the Catholic, the Hebrews, the Episcopal, in fact all churches, all creeds, who
have a belief in God, are as one in the opinion that it was a great mistake to
ever have removed this motto from our coins, and they are one in the sentiment that this motto shall be restored.82

He noted the history of the motto, arising from the national division of the
Rebellion, but asserted that the nation was united in wanting the motto returned as evidence of the religious convictions of the nation:
[T]he sentiment was born when we were a divided people. To-day, thank
God! we are a reunited people forever. We are but one people, with but one
country and one God, with an underlying patriotism for our country and a
steadfast faith in God. The American people are glad to honor themselves
and their country by having God’s name upon their coins. “We are fundamentally a religious people. We are distinguished by our devotion to religious and civil freedom.” I dare say that every form of religious thought is
represented in America, and yet we are one in the recognition of a supreme
and all-wise God.83

But, in the end, Congressman Edwards returned to the motto on coins as
a symbol of religious victory over the infidels: “God has undoubtedly
watched over us and directed us to national greatness, and I firmly believe
that it is because we are a God-fearing nation.”84 He had already endorsed
the quality of being God-fearing:
I am not ashamed to proclaim my faith in God. We need God-fearing men
in all public positions. A man who is not sound in his belief in God has no
right in high office, which is the gift of a God-fearing people. We represent
God-fearing people, and we, their representatives, should be God-fearing
representatives.85
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id. at 3387 (statement of Rep. Edwards) (“I do not charge, as some do, that the President is an
infidel.”).
Id. (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record).
Id. (preceding a note of “[Applause.]” in the record).
Id.
Id. at 3388.
Id. at 3387.
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The Congressman concluded with an appeal for the motto, cast in terms of
religious advocacy:
If we would continue as the greatest of the nations of the world we must continue our faith in God. The history of the nation that forgets God is sooner
or later written in ruin. Let us therefore fight infidelity until it is literally
stamped out of our country. Let us not retrograde, but rather let us go forward. Let us do nothing that smacks of national infidelity. Let us not put an
“infidel money” out upon the world, but let us put out the coin that says to
all the world “Americans are a God-fearing and God-loving people.”86

There were few voices raised in the House of Representatives against restoring the motto the nation’s coins. Congressman Küstermann of Wisconsin
opposed returning the motto to coinage: “I am against replacing the motto
‘In God we trust’ on our coins, because I do not believe in any religion that in
order to thrive needs advertising, nor do I believe in any person that always
hangs out his shingle ‘I am a Christian.’”87 Congressman George W. Gordon
of Tennessee characterized placing the motto on coins as “rather a show of
conventional hypocrisy than of patriotic reverence,” which was “a medium of
secular, and not sacred, transactions.”88 He asked, because people did not
stop to consider “its sacred significance,” “[D]oes it not seem rather a device
of hypocrisy and irreverence than of sincerity and veneration?”89
The committee report in the House reflected a religious motivation for the
action. Asserting that “the measure simply reflects the reverent and religious
conviction which underlies American citizenship,” the Committee adopted the
subcommittee’s rationale for the restoration of the motto to the nation’s coins:
Your subcommittee is unanimous in the belief that as a Christian nation we
should restore this motto to the coinage of the United States upon which it
was formerly inscribed “as an outward and visible form of the inward and
spiritual grace,” which should possess and inspire American citizenship, and
as an evidence to all the nations of the world that the best and only reliance
for the perpetuation of the republican institution is upon a Christian patriotism, which, recognizing the universal fatherhood of God, appeals to the
universal brotherhood of man as the source of the authority and power of all
just government.90

The measure passed the House of Representatives 259-5.91 As he had
indicated he would, President Roosevelt signed a resolution “That the motto
‘In God We Trust,’ heretofore inscribed on certain denominations of the gold
and silver coins of the United States of America, shall hereafter be inscribed
upon all such gold and silver coins of said denominations as heretofore.”92
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87
88
89
90
91
92

Id. at 3389.
Id. at 3386 (statement of Rep. Küstermann).
Id. at 3389 (statement of Rep. Gordon).
Id. at 3390.
H.R. REP. NO. 60-1106, at 1–2 (1908).
42 CONG. REC. 3391(1908).
Act of May 18, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-120, 35 Stat. 164 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(d)(1) (2012)).
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Once the nation was saved from infidelity by the return of In God we trust
to some American coins, the matter rested for almost five decades until the
expansion of the practice during the McCarthy era, to which we now turn.
C. Expansion During the McCarthy Era
Although after 1907, In God we trust appeared on virtually all American
coins, it did not appear on American bills. This was remedied during the
McCarthy era, in July of 1955, when legislation was approved requiring the
motto on all coins and currency of the United States.93
Insight into the administrative and legislative purpose behind the decision
to require In God we trust on currency can be gained from a related action
taken the year before, the modification of the Pledge of Allegiance to include
the words “under God.”94 The purpose of that action was hardly secular. In
his signing message, President Eisenhower started by noting that “From this
day forward, the millions of our school children will daily proclaim in every
city and town, every village and rural school house, the dedication of our
nation and our people to the Almighty.”95 He concluded his statement by
93

94

95

Act of July 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290. This predated another McCarthy-era act,
the adoption of In God we trust as our national motto, which happened a year later, in July of 1956.
Act of July 30, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-851, 70 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 36 U.S.C. § 302
(2012)).
Act of June 14, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2012)
(“I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it
stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.”). The argument has
been made that notwithstanding the inclusion of the words “under God,” recitation of the Pledge
is a patriotic, not a religious, exercise. In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that the Pledge
is a declaration of belief in allegiance and loyalty to the United States flag and the Republic
that it represents. The phrase “under God” is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement
of any religion, but a simple recognition of the fact noted in H. R. Rep. No. 1693, at 2:
“From the time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have reflected the
traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in God.” Reciting the Pledge, or listening to others recite it, is a patriotic exercise, not a religious one;
participants promise fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular God, faith,
or church.
Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 31 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). In one sense, of course, the argument is correct. As originally framed, the Pledge of Allegiance was not a religious affirmation for the simple reason that as originally framed the Pledge did
not include the language “under God.” As originally framed in 1892 by socialist Francis Bellamy,
the pledge read: “I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands, one nation,
indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.” The Pledge of Allegiance, USHISTORY.ORG,
http://www.ushistory.org/documents/pledge.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2017). In 1923 the text was
changed to make it specific to the United States: “I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United
States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all.” Id.
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill to Include the
Words “Under God” in the Pledge to the Flag (June 14, 1954), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1954, at 563 (1960).
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asserting the “profound meaning” of the law: “In this way we are reaffirming
the transcendence of religious faith in America’s heritage and future . . . .”96
The next year, Congress took up the related question of requiring by statute that the motto In God we trust be placed on all currency of the nation. The
formal discussion started on April 13, 1955, when Congressman Bennett of
Florida spoke in favor of H.R. 619, his bill “to provide that all United States
currency shall bear the inscription ‘In God we trust.’”97 His stated rationale
was a mix of Cold War politics and religion:
In these days when imperialistic and materialistic communism seeks to attack
and to destroy freedom, it is proper for us to seek continuously for ways to
strengthen the foundations of our freedom. At the base of our freedom is our
faith in God and the desire of Americans to live by His will and by His guidance. As long as this country trusts in God, it will prevail. To remind all of
us of this self-evident truth, it is proper that our currency should carry these
inspiring words, coming down to us through our history: “In God we trust.”98

On June 7, 1955, the House took up and passed H.R. 619 unanimously,
with little discussion.99 Besides repeating his comments from April, Congressman Bennett again made the religious link: “Nothing can be more certain than
that our country was founded in a spiritual atmosphere and with a firm trust
in God. While the sentiment of trust in God is universal and timeless, these
particular four words ‘In God We Trust’ are indigenous to our country.”100
The Senate took up the resolution three weeks later, under the leadership
of Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas. He described as “an oversight” the
fact that paper money had been issued for almost a century with “no inscription . . . reflecting the spiritual basis of our way of life.”101 With no debate,
the Senate passed the measure to “reaffirm a policy which has been in existence for over 75 years by way of expressing our trust in God.”102
Once the nation had affirmed the spiritual basis of our way of life by having In God we trust on all American currency, the matter rested for five decades, until the Second Omission, during the administration of George W.
Bush, to which we now turn.

96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id.
101 CONG. REC. 4384 (1955) (statement of Rep. Bennett).
Id.
Id. at 7796 (statement of Rep. Bennett).
Id.
Id. at 9448 (statement of Sen. Johnson).
Id. at 9449 (statement of Sen. Monroney). The Senate floor discussion was diverted by two ancillary
matters. Senator Carlson from Kansas wanted to put In God we trust on postage stamps. Id. at 9448
(statement of Sen. Carlson). Senator Case of South Dakota wanted to place an image of Mount
Rushmore on the one-dollar bill. Id. at 9448 (statement of Sen. Case).
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D. George W. Bush and the Second Omission
A century after Theodore Roosevelt dealt with the disappearance of In
God We Trust from our coinage, George W. Bush faced much the same problem. His challenge arose in 2007 with the issue of the Presidential-series onedollar coin.103 Like the First Omission under President Roosevelt, the Second Omission under President Bush was caused by an ambitious plan to
make the national coinage more dramatic and modern.
Like the situation a century earlier, the Second Omission started without
any drama. In December of 2005, Congress passed the statutory authorization for a new series of one-dollar coins, honoring America’s presidents.104
The bill was not controversial; it passed the Senate by unanimous consent
and the House by a vote of 291-113.105 President Bush signed the bill into
law days before Christmas, 2005.106
The statute authorizing the presidential series of one-dollar coins provided for the design of both the obverse and the reverse. The obverse was to
have “the name and likeness of a President” and certain “basic information”
about that President.107 In addition to the inscriptions “$1” and “United
States of America,” the reverse was to have “a likeness of the Statue of Liberty extending to the rim of the coin and large enough to provide a dramatic
representation of Liberty while not being large enough to create the impression of a ‘2-headed’ coin.”108 The provision which ultimately proved so controversial required In God we trust and E Pluribus Unum be done as “edge-incused inscriptions.”109 Edge-incused inscriptions are those carved into the
rim of the coin, on neither the obverse nor the reverse face. The statute
103
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In 1971, after a thirty-five-year hiatus in the production of one-dollar coins, the U.S. Mint started
issuing the denomination again. See Eisenhower Dollars, MY C OIN GUIDES, http://eisenhowerdollarguide.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). The Mint issued the Eisenhower dollar from 1971 to
1978, the Susan B. Anthony dollar from 1979 to 1981 and again in 1999, the American Silver Eagle
dollar starting in 1986, and the Sacagawea dollar starting in 2000. All four designs (including the
two modifications of the Sacagawea dollar) included “IN GOD WE TRUST” on the face. See
American Silver Eagle Coins, MY COIN GUIDES, http://silvereagleguide.com (last visited Dec. 31,
2017); Eisenhower Dollars, supra; Sacagawea Dollars, MY COIN GUIDES, http://sacagaweadollarguide.com (last visited Dec. 31, 2017); Susan B. Anthony Dollars, M Y COIN GUIDES, http://susanbanthonydollar.org (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
Presidential $1 Coin Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-145, 119 Stat. 2664, 2665 (2005) (codified at 31
U.S.C. §§ 5101, 5112).
151 CONG. REC. S13421–24 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 2005); 151 CONG. REC. H11447–50 (daily ed.
Dec. 13, 2005).
Presidential $1 Coin Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-145, 119 Stat. 2664 (giving December 22d as
the date of enactment).
31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(B).
Id. § 5112(n)(2)(A).
Presidential $1 Coin Act of 2005 § 102, 119 Stat. at 2666 (“The inscription of the year of minting
or issuance of the coin and the inscriptions ‘E Pluribus Unum’ and ‘In God We Trust’ shall be edgeincused into the coin.”).
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passed by Congress and signed by President Bush specifically provided that
In God We Trust be edge-incused on the new coin. But the statute went further; it was a paean to edge incusal. In its findings, Congress declared: “Placing inscriptions on the edge of coins, known as edge-incusing, is a hallmark
of modern coinage and is common in large-volume production of coinage
elsewhere in the world . . . but it has not been done on a large scale in United
States coinage in recent years.”110 Congress found that edge incusing the
mottos and emblems would allow for aesthetic improvements in the coins:
In order to revitalize the design of United States coinage and return circulating coinage to its position as not only a necessary means of exchange in
commerce, but also as an object of aesthetic beauty in its own right, it is
appropriate to move many of the mottos and emblems, the inscription of the
year, and the so-called ‘‘mint marks’’ that currently appear on the 2 faces of
each circulating coin to the edge of the coin, which would allow larger and
more dramatic artwork on the coins . . . .111

And Congress made a reference to an earlier age that was ironic, given the
controversy that was about to unfold:
[This] would allow larger and more dramatic artwork on the coins reminiscent of the so-called ‘‘Golden Age of Coinage’’ in the United States, at the
beginning of the Twentieth Century, initiated by President Theodore Roosevelt, with the assistance of noted sculptors and medallic artists James Earle
Fraser and Augustus Saint-Gaudens.112

In the calm before the storm, after Congress passed the authorizing statute for the edge-incused Presidential dollars but before the public became
aware of what had been done, President George W. Bush issued a proclamation regarding the national motto that spoke to its religious character:
On the 50th anniversary of our national motto, “In God We Trust,” we
reflect on these words that guide millions of Americans, recognize the blessings of the Creator, and offer our thanks for His great gift of liberty.
From its earliest days, the United States has been a Nation of Faith. . . .
....
As we commemorate the 50th anniversary of our national motto and
remember with thanksgiving God’s mercies throughout our history, we recognize a divine plan that stands above all human plans and continue to seek
His will.113

Once the public became aware of it, the edge-incused motto on the new
coin proved controversial.114 It was claimed that moving the motto to the

110
111
112
113
114

Id. § 101(11), 119 Stat. at 2665.
Id. § 101(10), 119 Stat. at 2665.
Id.
50th Anniversary of Our National Motto, ‘‘In God We Trust,’’ 2006, Proclamation No. 8038, 71
Fed. Reg. 43,343 (July 27, 2006).
See Faith Under Fire: New U.S. Dollar Coins Hide “In God We Trust,” WORLDNETDAILY (Nov. 27, 2006,
1:52 AM), http://www.wnd.com/2006/11/39043/.
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coin edge would “trivialize the words,”115 and feared that moving the motto
to the coin edge was a step on the path of removing it entirely.116 Moving In
God we trust to the edge of the coin was seen as evidence of faith being under
attack,117 part of an attempt to “phase God out of America.”118 The controversy over the new Presidential dollars became even more intense when the
Mint accidently produced and released a run of the new Presidential dollars
without even the edge-incused In God we trust motto.119
On June 28, 2007, the floor discussion turned to an amendment by Congressman Roger Wicker of Mississippi to “restore to the face, or the obverse,
of the dollar coin . . . that is being minted now, the words ‘In God We Trust’
and ‘E Pluribus Unum.’”120 Congressman Jose Serrano of New York spoke
in opposition to the amendment, not on the substance of having the mottos
on the coin, but because he believed the Wicker amendment would not accomplish the end the sponsor wanted.121
On September 7, 2007, Congressman Dan Burton of Indiana spoke to
the placement of the motto on coins, casting the question as part of a larger
controversy over the role of religion and faith in society:
There are a lot of people in this country who have tried to get all symbols of
religion, belief in God taken off of all public properties and coins and currency. Recently, there were thousands of coins minted without “In God We
Trust” on them, and now they’re talking about putting “In God We Trust”
in an obscure place on coins so that people can’t read it, right on the edge of
the coin. I think this is—we’re moving in a very, very wrong direction.122

Congressman Burton traced the conflict to the origins of the nation: “This
country was formed with a firm reliance on God Almighty, and when we
start taking God out of everything, as some people want to do, we run the
115

116

117
118

119

120
121
122

“In God We Trust” Redesign for Dollar Coins, CATH. NEWS AGENCY (Jan. 8, 2008, 2:11 PM),
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/in_god_we_trust_redesign_for_dollar_coins/ (“Critics had complained about the present placement of the motto, claiming its position on the outer
edge of the coins would trivialize the words.”).
Id. (“Tony Perkins, the president of the Family Research Council, said . . . his group had been concerned that ‘moving “In God We Trust” off the face of our coins was just one step toward removing
it altogether.’”).
See Faith Under Fire: New U.S. Dollar Coins Hide “In God We Trust,” supra note 114.
In God We Trust Controversy on Dollar Coins Resolved, SLIDESHARE, http://www.slideshare.net/stereotypedeyew03/in-god-we-trust-controversy-on-dollar-coins-resolved (last visited Sept. 12, 2017)
(“Shortly after the release of the Presidential Dollar series, there was public controversy about the
apparent omission of the ‘In God We Trust’ motto. Some widely circulated chain emails and articles stated that the motto had been removed as an attempt to ‘phase God out of America.’”).
153 CONG. REC. 17,956 (2007) (statement of Rep. Goode) (noting “numerous mint errors” based
on “accounts that as many as 30,000 dollars do not have the etching on the side of In God We
Trust or E Pluribus Unum.”).
Id. at 17,955 (statement of Rep. Wicker).
Id. at 17,956 (statement of Rep. Serrano) (“Your effect may be that you will go down in history as
the gentleman who took In God We Trust off the coins and didn’t put in on anywhere else.”).
Id. at 23,969–70 (statement of Rep. Burton).
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risk of having him turn his back on us.”123 He warned of the consequences
of taking the motto off currency:
Those who try to take God off of all things governmental, such as coinage
or currency . . . are making a terrible mistake, in my opinion. . . .
Once you start turning your back on the good Lord, I think you are going
to reap the whirlwind, and this is something this Nation cannot afford to do
right now.124

A corrective provision was included in the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2008.125 Heeding Congressman Burton’s warning, the nation avoided
turning its back on the good Lord, and the motto In God we trust returned to
the face of our coinage.
II. “FIRST, THE STATUTE MUST HAVE A SECULAR LEGISLATIVE
PURPOSE . . .”: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF HAVING
IN GOD WE TRUST ON OUR CURRENCY
Where the questions of religion are concerned people are guilty of every possible
kind of insincerity and intellectual misdemeanor.
—Sigmund Freud126

Given the clear religious tone of the history surrounding the placement,
retention, and expansion of In God we trust on our currency, it is not surprising
that the authorizing and mandating statutes have been the subject of constitutional challenges. The constitutionality of having In God we trust on our
currency has been considered five times: in 1970 by the Ninth Circuit in Aronow v. United States,127 in 1979 by the Fifth Circuit in O’Hair v. Murray,128 in
123
124
125

126
127

128

Id. at 23,970.
Id.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 623(a)(2), 121 Stat. 1844, 2018
(2007) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(F) (2012)) (“Inscription of ‘In God We Trust’.—The design on the obverse or the reverse shall bear the inscription ‘In God We Trust’.”).
SIGMUND FREUD, THE FUTURE OF AN ILLUSION, 56–57 (Ernest Jones ed., W. D. Robson-Scott
trans., Liveright Publ’g Corp. 1955) (1928).
432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970). The Aronow court found that the placement of In God we trust on currency had “nothing . . . to do with the establishment of religion,” that “[i]ts use is of a patriotic or
ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a governmental sponsorship of a religious
exercise,” and that the practice “is excluded from First Amendment significance because the motto
has no theological or ritualistic impact,” but has only “inspirational quality.” Id. at 243–44 (citing
PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238; then citing S. REP. NO. 84-637 (1955), as reprinted in 1955
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2417, 2417; and then quoting H. REP. NO. 84-1959 (1956), as reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3720, 3720–21). The court noted that it also offers “spiritual and psychological value.”
Id. at 244 (quoting H. REP. NO. 84-1959 (1956), as reprinted in 1956 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3720, 3720–21).
588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The Fifth Circuit affirmed without analysis a Texas
district court opinion rejecting challenges to the national motto and its placement on currency. Id.
at 1144. The district court followed the Ninth Circuit’s findings in Aronow that the motto and its
inclusion on currency “has nothing whatsoever to do with the establishment of religion,” and that
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1996 by the Tenth Circuit in Gaylor v. United States,129 in 2010 by the D.C.
Circuit in Kidd v. Obama,130 and in 2014 by the Second Circuit in Newdow v.
Peterson.131 While none of the cases sustained the challenges to the placement
of In God we trust on currency, their analyses were not uniform. One case was
decided before Lemon v. Kurtzman.132 The four cases decided after Lemon
found, among them, five different secular legislative purposes for the placement of In God we trust on currency.
A. Pre-Lemon: No Theological Impact
Writing the year before Lemon, the Aronow court first suggested that the
motto and its inclusion on currency “is of a patriotic or ceremonial character,”133 but then conceded that the terms “‘ceremonial’ and ‘patriotic’ may not
be particularly apt words to describe the category of the national motto.”134
Having apparently abandoned the patriotic or ceremonial justification,
the Aronow court shifted to the argument that In God we trust “is excluded from
First Amendment significance because the motto has no theological or ritualistic impact.”135 The court cited only one authority for this proposition,
and that authority does not support the assertion. The complete passage to
which the Aronow court cited is:

129

130

131

132
133

134
135

the motto was “‘excluded from First Amendment significance because the motto has no theological
or ritualistic impact.’” O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19, 19–20 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (quoting
Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243).
74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996). Gaylor addressed claims that the motto In God we trust and its
inscription on currency violated the Establishment Clause. Id. The Gaylor court found “the statutes
establishing the motto and requiring its reproduction on U.S. currency easily meet the requirements
of the Lemon test.” Id. at 216 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)). The Gaylor court
also evaluated the motto and currency statutes under the endorsement test, and determined the
motto and currency statutes “fulfill the requirements of the endorsement test.” Id. at 217.
387 F. App’x 2 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Kidd affirmed that the placement of In God We Trust on currency
did not violate the First Amendment, quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243, in a parenthetical for the
proposition that “[i]t is quite obvious that the national motto and slogan on coinage and currency . . . has nothing whatsoever to do with the establishment of religion.” Id.
753 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2014). The Newdow plaintiffs challenged the statutory provisions that require
the placement of the motto on the nation’s coins and currency based on the Establishment Clause,
the Free Exercise Clause, and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). Id. at 106. The
Newdow court declined to find either an Establishment Clause deficiency or a Free Exercise Clause
and RFRA defect in the motto In God We Trust and its placement on currency. Id. at 108–10.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Aranow, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970), was decided the
previous year.
Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 (“[T]he national motto and the slogan on coinage and currency ‘In God
We Trust’ . . . is of a patriotic or ceremonial character and bears no true resemblance to a governmental sponsorship of a religious exercise.”). The court cited no authority for this assertion.
Id. The concession was repeated by the district court in O’Hair v. Blumenthal. 462 F. Supp. 19, 20
(W.D. Tex. 1978) (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243).
Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 (citing PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238). This rationale was repeated by the
district court in O’Hair v. Blumenthal. 462 F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243).
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Separation purists like Jefferson might have theoretic objections to these, but
even he recognized that as a practical matter such ceremonial verbalizations
could frequently not be avoided; both his Declaration of Independence and his
Virginia Religious Freedom statute invoked God. The problems raised by such
references are not intrinsic but extrinsic; that is, of themselves they are of no
practical significance, but their importance lies in their facile and frequent use
to justify practices that raise substantial and practical church-state problems.136

The cited passage does not address whether In God we trust has theological or
ritualistic impact.
Nor did the Aronow court gain any support from its uncritical reliance on
the assertion that such religious references “could frequently not be
avoided.”137 If the assertion was structural, that the various writings could
not have been done without the references to God, it was obviously incorrect.138 If the assertion was political, that the various writings could not have
been done without references to God because of pressure from the Christian
majority to include them, it undermines, not supports, the assertion that the
writings are constitutional.
Beyond the fact that the only authority cited by the Aronow court for the
proposition that the placement of In God we trust on currency “is excluded
from First Amendment significance because the motto has no theological or
ritualistic impact”139 doesn’t offer any support, the proposition is itself untrue.
The motto has intrinsic religious content. If nothing else, the slogan In God

136
137
138

139

Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 n.2 (quoting PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238).
Id. (quoting PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238).
Pfeffer cites to the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia Religious Freedom statute.
PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238.
The Declaration of Independence contains four references to God: “Nature’s God,” “their
Creator,” “the Supreme Judge of the world,” and “divine Providence.” THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2, 5 (U.S. 1776). Each could have been written to be secular. “[T]he
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them,” id. para. 1,
could have been “the separate and equal station to which they are entitled.” “We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights,” id. para. 2, could have been, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed with certain unalienable Rights.” “[A]ppealing to the
Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions,” id. para. 5, could have been “appealing to the world for the rectitude of our intentions.” “[W]ith a firm reliance on the protection of
divine Providence,” id., could have been “with a firm reliance on our protection.”
The Virginia Act for Establishing Religious Freedom contains two references to God: “Almighty God” and the “Lord.” VA. CODE ANN. § 57-1 (2017) (“Act for religious freedom recited”).
Both could have been written to be secular. “Whereas, Almighty God hath created the mind free,”
id., could have been “the mind hath been created free.” “[A]nd therefore are a departure from the
plan of the holy author of our religion, who being Lord, both of body and mind yet chose not to
propagate it by coercions on either, as was in his Almighty power to do,” id., could have been “and
therefore are a departure from the proper role of religion, which ought not be propagated by coercions on either body or mind.”
Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243 (citing PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238). This rationale was repeated by the
district court in O’Hair v. Blumenthal. 462 F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243).
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we trust asserts that God exists, a question not historically considered devoid
of theological content. The existence of God was addressed by Aristotle in
his Metaphysics,140 and Plato in the Laws.141 It had enough theological weight
to be one of the first parts of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica.142 Some
assert the existence of a single God.143 Feuerbach wrote of God and humanity.144 In the 1830s Abner Kneeland declared his non-belief and was jailed
by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts for blasphemy;145 sixty years later
Robert Ingersoll declared his non-belief and was a celebrated author: “Is
there a supernatural power—an arbitrary mind—an enthroned God—a supreme will that sways the tides and currents of the world—to which all causes
bow? I do not deny. I do not know—but I do not believe.”146
It surely must be true that the question of whether God exists is not devoid of religious content. We are well to be reminded of St. Thomas Aquinas’s answer to the question of whether any created intellect can see the essence of God:
Since everything is knowable according as it is actual, God, Who is pure act
without any admixture of potentiality, is in Himself supremely knowable.
But what is supremely knowable in itself, may not be knowable to a particu-

140
141
142

143

144

145

146

ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, bk. XI, at 326–40 (John H. M’Mahon trans., George Bell & Sons
1891) (addressing the existence of God).
PLATO, LAWS, bk. 10, at 299 (R. G. Bury trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1952) (addressing the belief
in the gods).
1 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. I, q. 2, art. 3, at 13 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros. 1947) (“I answer that, The existence of God can be proved
in five ways.”).
E.g., Deuteronomy 6:4 (New Int’l Version) (containing the “Shema Yisra’el” prayer: “Hear, O Israel:
The Lord is our God, the Lord is One.”); THE QUR’AN, Surah 112:1–4, (Abdullah Yusuf Ali trans.,
Tahrike Tarsile Qur’an, Inc. 22d ed. 2007) (“Al Ikhlas, or Purity (of Faith). In the name of Allah,
Most Gracious, Most Merciful. 1. Say: He is Allah, the One and Only; 2. Allah, the Eternal, Absolute; 3. He begets not, nor is He begotten; 4. And there is none like unto Him.”); SOUTHERN
BAPTIST CONVENTION, THE BAPTIST FAITH AND MESSAGE (2000), http://www.sbc.net/bfm2000/bfm2000.asp (“II. God. There is one and only one living and true God.”).
See, e.g., LUDWIG FEUERBACH, THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 270 (Marian Evans trans., Trübner,
& Co. 3d ed. 1881) (“The necessary turning-point of history is therefore the open confession, that the
consciousness of God is nothing else than the consciousness of the species . . . .”); id. at x (“God is
man, man is God . . . .”); id. at xii (“[R]eligion takes the apparent, the superficial in Nature and humanity for the essential, and hence conceives their true essence as a separate, special existence.”).
See generally STEPHAN PAPA, THE LAST MAN JAILED FOR BLASPHEMY (1998); ABNER KNEELAND,
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DEFENSE OF ABNER KNEELAND, CHARGED WITH BLASPHEMY;
BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL COURT, IN BOSTON MASS. AT THE JANUARY TERM, IN 1834, at 37
(1834) (“To the Editor of the Trumpet. . . . Universalists believe in a god which I do not; but believe
that their god, with all his moral attributes, (aside from nature itself,) is nothing more than a chimera
of their own imagination.”).
4 ROBERT G. INGERSOLL, Why I Am an Agnostic., in THE WORKS OF ROBERT G. INGERSOLL 5, 63
(The Dresden Publ’g Co. 1902).
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lar intellect, on account of the excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen
by the bat by reason of its excess of light.147

Beyond the foundational theological assertion that God exists, the motto
In God we trust has further theological content on several levels. Because the
motto is In God we trust, and not In gods we trust, it asserts the existence of a
unitary god, not many gods. Because the motto is In God we trust, and not In
god we trust, it asserts the existence of a particular, in this case a Christian,
god.148 Because the motto is In God we trust, and not, for example, In God we
believe, it asserts the existence of a God in which one might trust; presumably
trust to respond to the human condition, to prayer, or to the need for intervention.149 The motto thus implicitly rejects the deist belief in a divine watchmaker who, having created the universe, stepped back.150 Finally, because
the motto is In God we trust, and not In God some trust, it suggests unanimity—
a God in whom we trust—where increasingly none exists.
B. Post-Lemon: Secular Purpose
The Aronow assertion that In God we trust has no theological impact was in
error; it is also no longer the relevant test. A year following Aronow, the Supreme Court decided Lemon, and the analysis shifted. Lemon established a
147
148

149

150

AQUINAS, supra note 142, pt. 1, q. 12, art. 1, at 49.
By capitalizing “God,” the statutes indicate it is a proper noun, referring to a specific god. See
Mignon Fogarty, Do You Capitalize “God”?, QUICKANDDIRTYTIPS.COM (Apr. 21, 2011),
http://www.quickanddirtytips.com/education/grammar/do-you-capitalize-god (“The name of
any specific deity is capitalized just like any other name, so when ‘God’ is used to refer to ‘the one
God,’ (in other words, in any monotheistic religion) it is capitalized.”). Interestingly, and for no
apparent grammatical reason, some authorities provide that the devil is not capitalized even when
used as a proper noun. See, e.g., JANE STRAUS & LESTER KAUFMAN, THE BLUE BOOK OF
GRAMMAR AND PUNCTUATION 50 (Tom Stern ed., 11th ed. 2014) (“Do not capitalize . . . the
devil . . . .”). But see Capitalization Rules, LETTERS LIBRARY, http://letterslibrary.com/writingtips/capitalization-rules/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2017) (“Capitalize all names for the Devil.”). The
capitalization of the motto varies. The statute establishing the motto specifies the “I” and “G” as
capital letters: “In God we trust.” 36 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). The statutes requiring the motto on
coins and bills specify all initial capital letters: “In God We Trust.” 31 U.S.C. §§ 5112(d)(1), 5114(b).
Existing currency of all denominations has the motto in all capital letters: “IN GOD WE TRUST.”
See Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1022 n.1 (4th Cir., 1980) (explaining that the “Motorist’s
Prayer” on North Carolina’s state map potentially evoked a “narrowly confined intercessory supplication for deity’s private attention” and intervention: “While the prayer at issue might at first
blush seem utterly innocuous, there are doubtless many even within the main theological stream of
the dominant religious culture of the affected populace who are at least made uncomfortable, and
perhaps are positively offended, by the sort of narrowly confined intercessory supplication for deity’s
private attention that it represents.”).
See Thomas Paine, Of the Religion of Deism Compared with the Christian Religion, and the Superiority of the
Former over the Latter, THE PROSPECT; OR VIEW OF THE MORAL WORLD, 1804, reprinted in 4 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS PAINE 315, 317 (Moncure Daniel Conway ed., 1908) (“When we see a
watch, we have as positive evidence of the existence of a watchmaker, as if we saw him; and in like
manner the creation is evidence to our reason and our senses of the existence of a Creator.”).
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three-part test to evaluate governmental actions challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion.’”151
Focusing on the first Lemon prong, that the challenged governmental action
must have a secular purpose, we need to consider how the required secular
purpose is to be identified. Here, the analysis of Professor Andrew Koppelman
is helpful.152 He starts with the justification behind the secular purpose requirement: “What the state may not do—what the doctrine properly forbids it to
do—is declare any particular religious doctrine to be the true one, or enact
laws that clearly imply such a declaration of religious truth.”153 This he bases
on the well-settled principles set forth in Epperson v. Arkansas:
Government in our democracy, state and national, must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any
religion or to the advocacy of no-religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the
militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.154

Koppelman identifies four principle objections to the secular purpose requirement, two of which relate to our discussion.
The first is “the rubber stamp objection,” which “holds that nearly anything can satisfy the secular purpose requirement, because a secular rationale
can be imagined for almost any law.”155 Koppelman uses Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s formulation in Wallace v. Jaffree to illustrate the objection:
If the purpose prong is intended to void those aids to sectarian institutions
accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid religion, the prong will
condemn nothing so long as the legislature utters a secular purpose and says
nothing about aiding religion. Thus the constitutionality of a statute may
depend upon what the legislators put into the legislative history and, more
importantly, what they leave out.156

The second is “the evanescence objection,” which “claims that the ‘purpose’ that the rule seeks either does not exist or is not knowable by judges.”157
To illustrate the objection, Koppelman uses Justice Scalia:
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002).
Id. at 88.
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1968).
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 88 (emphasis omitted).
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 88 (emphasis omitted). The third and fourth objections noted by
Koppelman are “the participation objection” which “argues that the rule makes religious people
into second-class citizens by denying them the right to participate in the legislative process,” and
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Justice Antonin Scalia has been the most forceful advocate of the second objection, which I have called the evanescence objection. He argues that the
legislative purpose upon which the prong depends either does not exist or is
not knowable by judges, because “discerning the subjective motivation of those
enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible task.”158

Koppelman meets the rubber stamp objection and the evanescence objection in part by advocating an objective secular purpose analysis rather
than a subjective analysis. “The answer to the rubber stamp and evanescence objections,” he writes, “is that what government says is sometimes obvious on the face of the statute.”159 This type of case makes a subjective inquiry unnecessary:
Even without looking to the intent of those passing a law or the perceptions
of those subject to it, sometimes the meaning of a state law is obvious. It
cannot be inappropriate for judges to recognize what is obvious to everyone
else. . . . When the state argues that its law reflects a secular purpose, the
appropriate response will sometimes be neither psychoanalysis of the legislature nor a survey of public opinion; laughter will suffice.160

Koppelman does not propose a narrow objective inquiry; he would let
the reviewing court consider the context in which the statute was passed:
The plausibility of the state’s proffered secular justification is context-dependent. The objective approach to legislative purpose does not confine the
Court’s attention to the four corners of the statute. The context in which
the law was enacted is an objective fact about it, and one that the court may
properly take into account in discerning the law’s purpose.161

What is not clear is whether Koppelman’s broad objective inquiry would include as permitted context what we might term the legislative history of the
challenged statute, such as the statements of legislators and the executive accompanying passage of the statute into law. Apparently Professor Koppelman
would not include the legislative history in that broader contextual analysis.
Referring to Wallace as “the least defensible of the secular purpose decisions,”
he observes: “This is the secular purpose opinion that relied most heavily upon
the legislative history of the law in question. I have argued that it is never
appropriate to rely on such history to find a lack of secular purpose . . . .”162

158
159
160

161
162

“the callous indifference objection” which “holds that the secular purpose requirement . . . would
forbid the humane accommodation of religious dissenters . . . .” Id. at 88–89 (emphases omitted).
Id. at 99 (quoting Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
Id. at 113.
Id. at 114–15 (noting that Professor Charles Black “pointed out long ago that the proper response
to the solemn assertion that segregated facilities did not declare the inferiority of blacks was ‘one of
the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that of laughter’” (quoting Charles L. Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 424 (1960))).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 147–48.
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It may be true that a subjective analysis of a challenged statute will rarely
yield information upon which a finding of unconstitutionality under the secular purpose test might be based. Chief Justice Rehnquist was probably correct
that legislatures have become more clever in masking their improper motives,
that in enacting statutes to aid religion the typical legislature “utters a secular
purpose and says nothing about aiding religion.”163 For the same reason, Justice Scalia was probably correct that “discerning the subjective motivation of
those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always an impossible
task.”164 And Professor Koppelman is probably correct that “sometimes the
meaning of a state law is obvious.”165 But to say that legislatures have become
more clever in masking their actual motivations, to say that it is almost always
impossible to ascertain a legislature’s actual purpose, to say that it is sometimes
clear what the meaning of a statute is, is not to say that it is always so.166 Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that the administrative and legislative
histories behind the placement of In God we trust on currency—the origins during the Rebellion, the First Omission, the expansion during the McCarthy
era, and the Second Omission—provide an example of when the subjective
purpose of administrators and legislators can be reliably ascertained.
In that admittedly rare case where the subjective purpose of a legislature
enacting a challenged statute can be reliably ascertained, should it be sufficient
for a finding of unconstitutionality? A hypothetical helps illustrate the issue.
Suppose an extreme anti-Muslim state legislator wants to take a stand against
“radical Islamic terrorism.” Acting on his illogical conflation of observant
Muslims and terrorists, and his mistaken belief that the Tennessee coneflower
(echinaccea tennesseensis) is necessary for the Muslim celebration of the birth of the
Prophet Muhammad, Mawlid al-Nabi,167 he secures the passage of a law to
163
164
165

166

167

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 114. It might be noted that there are examples where the meaning,
that is, the effect, of a statute is quite clear even when the purpose, that is, the reason for the enactment, is not.
The clumsy maneuvering of two Kentucky counties over the display of the Ten Commandments,
described in McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 856–57 (2005), illustrates the point:
The ACLU moved to supplement the preliminary injunction to enjoin the Counties’ third
display, and the Counties responded with several explanations for the new version, including
desires “to demonstrate that the Ten Commandments were part of the foundation of American Law and Government” and “to educate the citizens of the county regarding some of
the documents that played a significant role in the foundation of our system of law and
government.” The court, however, took the objective of proclaiming the Commandments’
foundational value as “a religious, rather than secular, purpose” . . . and found that the assertion that the Counties’ broader educational goals are secular “crumble[s] . . . upon an
examination of the history of this litigation.”
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting ACLU v. McCreary Cty., 14 F. Supp. 2d 845, 848–49 (E.D. Ky.
2001)).
This would have been incorrect both because Mawlid al-Nabi is not a required holiday for Muslims.
See Shaykh Muhammad Saalih al-Munajjid, Mawlid al-Nabi (the Prophet’s Birthday), ISLAM QUESTION
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prohibit the cultivation of the Tennessee coneflower within, and the importation of the flower into, his state. Would such a statute survive or fail the first
prong of Lemon, that “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose”?168
What if the legislator is candid about the reasons for the statute, and includes “whereas” clauses in the legislation that make clear its anti-Muslim rationale,169 and the rationale is repeated without dissent in the legislative debate
and the Governor’s signing message. Should the statute survive or fail the first
prong of Lemon, that “the statute must have a secular legislative purpose”?170 If
one looked objectively at the statute, finding its purpose only in terms of what
it did—banning the echinaccea tennesseensis—and the context contained in the
four corners of the enactment, it should be held unconstitutional. It is true that
the statute has no effect on religion since the sponsor, the legislature, and the
Governor are mistaken in their belief that the Tennessee coneflower is essential
for the Muslim observance of Mawlid al-Nabi. The effect of the statute is
simply to add another item to the controlled dangerous substance list, which
the state has broad police powers to do, absent an improper motive. But that
goes to the second prong of Lemon, that the challenged statute’s “principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”171
Even though they are acting on a factually incorrect assumption about the role
of the Tennessee coneflower in the Muslim observance of Mawlid al-Nabi, the
action is still taken with an improper purpose. And the “whereas” statements
in the statute surely evidence an improper purpose.

AND ANSWER (July 6, 1998), https://islamqa.info/en/249 (“There is nothing in the Qur’aan to say

168

169

170
171

that we should celebrate the Mawlid or birthday of the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allaah be
upon him).”). It would also appear to be incorrect because the Tennessee coneflower, being indigenous to only a small part of Tennessee, would not appear to have any special significance in the
Muslim faith.
Tennessee Coneflower—No Longer Endangered, NATURE CONSERVANCY,
https://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/northamerica/unitedstates/tennessee/explore/tennessee-coneflower.xml (last visited Dec. 31, 2017) (“The Tennessee coneflower is only
found in cedar glades and barrens of Middle Tennessee.”).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). Assume for our purposes that we avoid any standing issue by having the statute challenged by a Muslim resident of the state, an American citizen by
birth, who has for many years engaged in the business of raising, importing, and selling beautiful
flowers, including the white flag iris.
For example:
WHEREAS, radical Islamic terrorism poses a clear and present danger to the people of
this State;
WHEREAS, Islam’s goal is the destruction of Western civilization from within, and Islam
is a cancer on our nation that needs to be cut out;
WHEREAS, the jihadist network does exist in this State, and Muslim Americans who subscribe to Islam are just as bad as ISIS;
WHEREAS, Islam and thus radical Islamic terrorism are fostered by Mawlid al-Nabi, the
Muslim celebration of the birth of the so-called Prophet Muhammad;
AND WHEREAS, the celebration of Mawlid al-Nabi is impossible without the presence
of the Tennessee coneflower (echinaccea tennesseensis).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
Id.
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What if the legislator is clever about the reasons for the statute, and remains silent about his anti-Muslim rationale? If one looks objectively at the
statute finding its purpose only in terms of what it does—ban the echinaccea
tennesseensis—and the four corners of the statute, it has nothing to do with
religion. The effect of the statute is simply to add another item to the controlled dangerous substance list, which the state has broad police powers to
do. Presumably, the statute would be held constitutional.
But what of the third possibility, where the legislator is silent about the
reasons for the statute in the statute itself, but is candid in the discussions surrounding the enactment? Assume the state representative is open about his
motivations, but instead of inserting “whereas” clauses to explain his purpose,
he relies upon a speech on the floor of the legislature to accomplish the same
end. Further assume that his rationale is repeated in the floor debate, without
opposition, and in the Governor’s signing statement. Here the evidence of an
improper purpose has shifted from the four corners of the statute to the legislative history. Again, the statute does not run afoul of Lemon’s second prong,
since it was based on an incorrect understanding of the role of the Tennessee
coneflower in the Muslim celebration of Mawlid al-Nabi. But if one purpose
of the Establishment Clause is to avoid civil strife based on religious belief,
then such a bigoted piece of legislation ought not withstand constitutional
scrutiny merely because its proponents missed their aim. Surely the enactment itself does sufficient damage to the nation that it ought not stand. A
subjective review that included legislative history would achieve the proper
result in our third hypothetical, where an objective review might not.
Correctly conceived, the secular purpose test of Lemon ought to include
two reviews. The first should be: Is the legislative purpose behind the challenged statute fairly ascertainable, and if it is, is it secular? Where the legislative purpose cannot be fairly ascertained, or where the subjective review
indicates a secular purpose, the inquiry should proceed to the second review.
Where the legislative purpose can be fairly ascertained, and where that purpose is non-secular, the statute should be declared unconstitutional. This
inquiry is whether a secular purpose existed as of the time of the governmental action, not whether it can be created as a post hoc rationalization of what
the government might have thought if they had thought of it.172 Clearly,
because of evolving legislative powers of mendacity and legitimate questions
172

See id. at 612. In reviewing the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes, the Lemon court was clearly
looking at the contemporaneous legislative record, not a post hoc rationalization of legislative intent:
Inquiry into the legislative purposes of the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes affords
no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion. On the contrary,
the statutes themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of the
secular education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws. There is no
reason to believe the legislatures meant anything else. . . . [W]e find nothing here that undermines the stated legislative intent; it must therefore be accorded appropriate deference.
Id. at 613.
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as to how often legislative purpose can fairly be identified, this first review
would rarely be dispositive. Nevertheless, it ought to be undertaken.
The second review in the Lemon secular purpose test should be: Is an objective legislative purpose fairly ascertainable from the four corners of the
statute and the context in which the legislature acted? This review has three
parts: (1) Is the asserted purpose in fact secular, (2) is the asserted secular
purpose of the action fairly indicated by the language and context of the statute, and (3) is the connection between the action taken and the asserted secular purpose plausible?
A hypothetical helps illustrate the second review. Suppose the Iowa legislature passes a bill providing for a sign at each federal highway entrance into
the state proclaiming Jesus is the son of the Living God. When the statute is challenged, it proves impossible to fairly ascertain a subjective legislative purpose
because the measure is introduced without any legislative findings, is sent to
the floor without any committee consideration, is voted upon without discussion, is passed by both houses by narrow margins, and is signed by the Governor without comment. When challenged, Iowa defends the measure by claiming that its secular purpose is to honor Iowa’s son, President Herbert Hoover.
The first part of the objective review asks if the asserted purpose is secular.
Here, the asserted purpose for the statute—honoring President Hoover—is
clearly secular and appropriate for government action. The second part of the
objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context. Here, there is no indication of the asserted
secular purpose (or any purpose) in the language or context of the statute. The
proponents should have been more mendacious. The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the statute and the asserted secular
purpose is plausible. Here, the question is how the placement of Jesus is the son
of the Living God on billboards advances the secular purpose of honoring President Hoover. Even given a high degree of deference for legislative findings, of
which there were none in our hypothetical, it must be true that this statute
would not withstand judicial scrutiny because there is absolutely no connection
between the challenged action and the asserted secular purpose.173
173

See Micah Schwartzman, What If Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1351, 1360–61 (2012)
(“[T]he government’s proffered secular purpose cannot be a false rationalization for the law. No
court has recognized a sham secular purpose as satisfying the demands of the Establishment
Clause.” (first citing McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 864 (2005) (“[T]he secular purpose
required has to be genuine, not a sham . . . .”); then citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290, 308 (2000) (“When a governmental entity professes a secular purpose for an arguably
religious policy, the government’s characterization is . . . entitled to some deference. But it is nonetheless the duty of the courts to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere one.’” (second
alteration in original)))). The cited sources stand for the proposition that courts shouldn’t recognize
sham secular purposes as satisfying the demands of the Establishment Clause, not the assertion that
they haven’t. See, e.g., Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (asserting that In
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The third part of the inquiry asks only if a link between the governmental
action and the secular purpose is plausibly asserted, not if it is true. Reviewing courts have been less than rigorous on this point. In Hall v. Bradshaw, the
Fourth Circuit struck down a “Motorist’s Prayer” printed by the State of
North Carolina on roadmaps:
Our heavenly Father, we ask this day a particular blessing as we take the
wheel of our car. Grant us safe passage through all the perils of travel; shelter
those who accompany us and protect us from harm by Thy mercy; steady
our hands and quicken our eye that we may never take another’s life; guide
us to our destination safely, confident in the knowledge that Thy blessings
go with us through darkness and light . . . sunshine and shower . . . forever
and ever. Amen.174

North Carolina asserted, and the district court found, “that the purpose
of the prayer was to promote highway safety, which is secular.”175 The Hall
court correctly concluded “that the state action here does not reflect a clearly
secular purpose but instead impermissibly sponsors religious activity.”176 But
the court seemingly left open the possibility that a state-sponsored prayer
could result in safer conditions on North Carolina roads:
The district court accepted defendant’s contention that the prayer promoted
safety, which is a legitimate secular purpose. A prayer, however, is undeniably religious and has, by its nature, both a religious purpose and effect.
While we agree that the prayer may foster the state’s legitimate concern for
safety of motorists, the state cannot escape the proscriptions of the Establishment Clause merely by identifying a beneficial secular purpose. The inquiry
goes beyond this. . . . A prayer, because it is religious, does advance religion,
and the limited nature of the encroachment does not free the state from the
limitations of the Establishment Clause.177

How this might have worked, neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit
explained.
The post-Lemon cases on the placement of In God we trust on currency identified five secular purposes behind the challenged governmental action. It is
illuminating to evaluate these asserted secular purposes, using both the subjective and objective reviews.

174
175
176
177

God we trust serves secular purpose of fostering patriotism); O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19,
20 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (finding that In God we trust on currency “served a secular ceremonial purpose
in the obviously secular function of providing a medium of exchange.”).
Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1019 (4th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1020–21.
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C. First Secular Purpose: Formalizing Our Medium of Exchange
The first secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts related to the
role of currency. This was advanced in O’Hair and Gaylor. Looking to Aronow,
the O’Hair district court found “that the primary purpose of the slogan was
secular; it served a secular ceremonial purpose in the obviously secular function of providing a medium of exchange.”178 The Gaylor court seemed to be
getting at the same concept when, citing O’Hair, it found a secular purpose
in that the placement of In God we trust on currency “formalizes our medium
of exchange.”179
As to the subjective review, neither the O’Hair court nor the Gaylor court
offered any evidence at all, much less any evidence from the contemporaneous historical record, that the administrative and legislative actors who put
In God we trust on our national currency did so to serve a secular ceremonial
purpose related to the secular function of providing a medium of exchange,
or to formalize our medium of exchange.
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is
secular. Here, while it is correct that for a nation to provide a medium of
exchange is a secular function of government, the “secular ceremonial purpose” of including In God we trust on that medium of exchange is far from
clear, especially since the O’Hair court conceded, like the Aronow court, that
“‘ceremonial’ and ‘patriotic’ may not be particularly apt words to describe
the category of the national motto.”180 While one might concede that the
purpose served by having the motto on currency is “ceremonial,” in that the
purpose is not functional, the O’Hair court did not explain why the inclusion
of In God we trust is a secular ceremonial purpose and not a religious ceremonial
purpose, or offer any support for its secular purpose finding, other than a
citation to Aronow.181
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose
of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context. Here, the O’Hair
court was silent as to whether the asserted secular purpose of serving a secular
ceremonial purpose relating to the secular function of providing a medium of
exchange is fairly indicated by the language and context of the statute.
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible. Here, the O’Hair court
178

179
180
181

O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20 (citing Aranow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970)).
Other than using the word “secular” three times in the same sentence, this assertion of secular
purpose is truly muddled.
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20).
See O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243).
Id. at 19–20 (agreeing with the Aronow court that the motto does not violate the Establishment
Clause).
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did not explain how placing In God we trust could be plausibly associated with
serving a secular ceremonial purpose relating to the secular function of
providing a medium of exchange.182
As to the related Gaylor claim that the motto “formalizes our medium of
exchange,” the objective review is equally unsupportive. The first part of the
objective review asks if the asserted purpose is secular. Here, again, it is difficult to know what the court means. The Oxford Dictionary defines “formalize” to mean the act of giving something legal or formal status.183 Surely the
Gaylor court was not claiming that the inclusion of the motto was necessary to
give the nation’s currency legal status. If by “formalizes our medium of exchange,” the court meant that the inclusion of In God we trust on currency makes
the currency more formal—like wearing a tie or nicely polished shoes—the
reference is simply curious.184
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context. Here, the
Gaylor court was silent as to whether the asserted secular purpose of formalizing our medium of exchange is fairly indicated by the language and context
of the statute.
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible. Here, the Gaylor court
did not explain how placing In God we trust could be plausibly associated with
formalizing our medium of exchange.
D. Second Secular Purpose: Fostering Patriotism
The second secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that having
In God we trust on currency “fosters patriotism.”185 This was advanced in Gaylor.
As to the subjective review, neither the Gaylor court nor the Aronow court
to which it cited offered any support at all, much less any evidence from the
contemporaneous historical record, that the administrative and legislative actors who put In God we trust on our national currency did so to foster patriotism.
There are scattered references to patriotism in the historical record, but they
are few in number and are either cast in terms of “Christian patriotism”186 or
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 20 (asserting only that In God we trust has a “secular ceremonial purpose”).
Formalize, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/formalize (last
visited Oct. 2, 2017) (“Give (something) legal or formal status.”).
Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing O’Hair, 462 F. Supp. at 20).
Id. at 216 (citing Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243).
H. COMM. ON COINAGE, WEIGHTS, AND MEASURES, 60th CONG., TO RESTORE THE MOTTO
“IN GOD WE TRUST” TO THE COINS OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (1908) (submitted by Rep. William B. McKinley). The report stated:
Your subcommittee is unanimous in the belief that as a Christian nation we should restore
this motto . . . “as an outward and visible form of the inward and spiritual grace,” which
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the patriotism of Christians,187 or seemingly distinguish In God we trust from
patriotic slogans.188
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is
secular. Here, the asserted purpose of fostering patriotism is secular. The
second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose of the
statute is fairly indicated by its language and context. Here, as to whether
the asserted secular purpose of fostering patriotism is fairly indicated by the
language and context of the statute, the Gaylor court is silent.
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible. Here, neither the Gaylor
court nor the Aronow court to which it cited explain how the inclusion of In
God we trust on currency fosters patriotism. The Gaylor court offers no hint
other than a reference to the Aronow opinion, in which, it should be remembered, the court conceded that “‘ceremonial’ and ‘patriotic’ may not be particularly apt words to describe the category of the national motto.”189 Neither Aronow nor Gaylor offered any support for the proposition other than the
bare citation in Gaylor to the unsupported assertion in Aronow.
E. Third Secular Purpose: Expressing Confidence in the Future
The third secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that having In God we trust on currency “expresses confidence in the future.”190 This
was advanced in Gaylor and Newdow.

should possess and inspire American citizenship, and as an evidence to all the nations of
the world that the best and only reliance for the perpetuation of the republican institution
is upon a Christian patriotism, which, recognizing the universal fatherhood of God, appeals to the universal brotherhood of man as the source of the authority and power of all
just government.
187

188

189
190

Id.
N. W. Merrill, Letter to the Editor, Like the Atheism of France in 1790, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1124
(1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 513 (1908) (“The dropping from our coins of
the motto ‘In God we trust’ appeals to every Christian who has a spark of patriotism left in his
heart.”).
Charles B. Thompson, Letter to the Editor, It Expresses the Nation’s Faith, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD
1124 (1907), as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 514 (“A motto expressive of patriotism
has no more right upon our coins than one expressive of the faith without which a nation would
presently find itself in the dust. Old Glory is not too good for everyday use; neither is the grand old
motto which has so long publicly expressed the highest faith of the great American people.”).
Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243. This concession was repeated by the district court in O’Hair. O’Hair, 462
F. Supp. at 20 (quoting Aronow, 432 F.2d at 243).
Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). Similarly, the Newdow court found a secular purpose because “[governmental] acknowledgements [of religion], . . . and the printing of ‘In God We Trust’ on our coins serve the secular purpose
of . . . expressing confidence in the future . . . .” Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014)
(first two alterations in original) (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
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As to the subjective review, neither the Gaylor court nor the Newdow court
offered any support at all, much less any evidence from the contemporaneous
historical record, that the administrative and legislative actors who put In God
we trust on our national currency did so to express confidence in the future.
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is
secular. Here, the asserted purpose of expressing confidence in the future
could be secular, unless our confidence in the future is based on a particular
religious belief. Such a particular religious belief which produces confidence
in the future might be indicated by a slogan such as In God we trust.
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context. Here, as to
whether the asserted secular purpose of expressing confidence in the future
is fairly indicated by the language and context of the statute, the Gaylor and
Newdow courts are silent.
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible. Here, neither the Gaylor
court nor the Newdow court explained how the inclusion of In God we trust on
currency “expresses confidence in the future.” The Gaylor court offered no
hint other than a reference to the Lynch opinion.191 In Lynch, Justice O’Connor was equally unclear, asserting without explanation or support not only
that the motto expresses confidence in the future, but that it is of a class of
religious statements that are the only way in which such expressions are reasonably possible.192 It simply is not true that the statement In God we trust and
similar religious assertions are the only way reasonably possible in our culture
in which to express confidence in the future. Take, for example, Ralph
Waldo Emerson’s declaration:
Men are made up of potencies. We are magnets in an iron globe. We have
keys to all doors. We are all inventors, each sailing out on a voyage of discovery, guided each by a private chart, of which there is no duplicate. The
world is all gates, all opportunities, strings of tension waiting to be
struck . . . .193

Indeed, a non-religious expression of confidence in the future brief enough
to be included on currency could surely be crafted. For example, the currency might be emblazoned with Confident in Our Future.

191
192

193

Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Those government acknowledgements of religion serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes
of . . . expressing confidence in the future . . . .”).
RALPH WALDO EMERSON, LETTERS AND SOCIAL AIMS 137 (1904).
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F. Fourth Secular Purpose: Encouraging the Recognition of What Is Worthy
The fourth secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that having In God we trust on currency “encourag[es] the recognition of what is worthy
of appreciation in society.”194 This was advanced in Newdow.
As to the subjective review, the Newdow court did not offer any evidence
at all, much less any support from the contemporaneous historical record,
that the administrative and legislative actors who put In God we trust on our
national currency did so to encourage the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society.
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is
secular. Here, the asserted purpose of encouraging the recognition of what
is worthy of appreciation in society could be secular, unless what is worthy of
appreciation in society is religious in nature. Such a focus on religious belief
as being what is worthy of appreciation in society might be indicated by a
slogan such as In God we trust.
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose
of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context. Here, as to
whether the asserted secular purpose of encouraging the recognition of what
is worthy of appreciation in society is fairly indicated by the language and
context of the statute, the Newdow court is silent.
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible. Here, the Newdow court
did not explain how the inclusion of In God we trust on currency “encourages
the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.” The sole authority cited was Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Lynch,195 and she provided no support for the assertion.196
G. Fifth Secular Purpose: Referencing Our Religious Heritage
The fifth secular purpose divined by the post-Lemon courts was that having In God we trust on currency “symbolizes the historical role of religion in
our society,”197 or serves as a “reference to our religious heritage.”198 This
was advanced in Gaylor and Newdow.
194

195
196
197
198

Newdow, 753 F.3d at 108 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693). The Newdow court also asserted that the
inscription of In God we trust on currency serves “the secular purpose of solemnizing public occasions.” Id. at 108 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693). This ought not be taken as a serious argument.
Id. at 108 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693).
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 693.
Gaylor, 465 U.S. at 216 (citing Lynch. 465 U.S. at 676).
Newdow, 753 F.3d at 108 (“[T]he motto, and its inclusion in the design of U.S. currency is a ‘reference to our religious heritage.’” (first quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 676; and then citing County of
Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment))).
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As to the subjective review, neither the Gaylor court nor the Newdow court
offered any support at all, much less any evidence from the contemporaneous
historical record, that the administrative and legislative actors who put In God
we trust on our national currency did so as a reference to our religious heritage.
As to the objective review, the first part asks if the asserted purpose is secular.
Here, the asserted purpose of recognizing the historical role of religion in our
society might be secular. But the historical record surrounding the placement
of In God we trust on our currency is so completely about recognizing only the
role of the Christian religion in our society, and the tone of the history sounds
so strongly in terms of advocacy and not historical recognition, that a strong
argument could be made that the asserted purpose is religious, not secular.
The second part of the objective review asks if the asserted secular purpose of the statute is fairly indicated by its language and context. Here, as to
whether the asserted secular purpose of recognizing the historical role of religion in our society is fairly indicated by the language and context of the
statute, the Gaylor and Newdow courts were silent.
The third part of the objective review asks if the connection between the
statute and the secular purpose asserted is plausible. Here, neither the Gaylor
court nor the Newdow court explained how the inclusion of In God we trust on
currency serves as a “reference to our religious heritage.”
H. Eluding Secular Purpose: De Minimis, Ceremonial Deism, and De Facto
Establishment
Some courts and commentators have attempted to elude the result of the
secular purpose analysis by suggesting that a range of governmental actions
involving religious expression are not worthy of our attention because they
are inconsequential, because their religious content is somehow not what it
appears, or because they are otherwise somehow rendered constitutional.
Thus one commentator opined that having the motto on currency was “of
no practical significance,” and was a “meaningless . . . act of ceremonial obeisance,” perhaps to be taken by some as suggesting it should be constitutionally
differentiated from some “[g]overnment expenditures of tax-raised funds for
religious institutions” by the magnitude of the expenditures.199 Another advocated for a de minimis analysis, under which “trifling” violations might avoid the
heavy hand of the federal courts:
199

PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 169, 238. The author of the cited source believed the motto was unimportant:
Items such as the reference to God on coins . . . are insignificant to the point of being trivial. Government expenditures of tax-raised funds for religious institutions cannot easily be
justified on the basis of so meaningless an act of ceremonial obeisance. (It is difficult to
understand why true religionists do not resent, rather than approve, this marriage of God
and Mammon.)
Id. at 169 (footnote omitted).
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[T]o say . . . that there is no place at all for de minimis may turn out to be
embarrassingly extreme, for the number of small instances of government
support, or at least favorable recognition, of religious activity is so great and
they are so pervasive that they go unnoticed until attention is drawn to them.
. . . [T]he Supreme Court may yet be glad to have available a doctrine
that some matters are really so trifling that they do not set in action the somewhat ponderous machinery of the Federal Government. A few months after
the McCollum decision was handed down, a member of the board of education in an upstate New York village had occasion to visit his school.
Christmas was coming, and small children has pasted up in their classrooms
various pictures—laden camels, and wise men, and a star with spreading
rays, and cut-outs of a canonized Lycian bishop of the early Christian
church, named Nicholas, white bearded and dressed for sleighing in red garments. As the trustee had learned of the McCollum case he fell to thinking
about these clearly sectarian manifestations to which the children of the district, under threat of the truancy laws, were unavoidably subjected. He wondered curiously whether a federal court, if asked, would send a marshal,
heavy with the power and majesty of these United States, to scrape the children’s pasted pictures from the schoolroom walls.200

The O’Hair court quoted Justice Brennan as he sought to avoid the de
minimis characterization in favor of an argument that frequent repetition
somehow purged In God we trust of its religious meaning:
It is not that the use of [In God we trust] can be dismissed as “de minimis” . . . The truth is that we have simply interwoven the motto so deeply
into the fabric of our civil polity that its present use may well not present that
type of involvement which the First Amendment prohibits.201

It is a curious argument that repetition transforms a religious statement into
a secular one.
Related is the “ceremonial deism” argument advanced in both Gaylor and
Newdow. Thus the Gaylor court suggested: “The motto’s primary effect is not
to advance religion; instead, it is a form of ‘ceremonial deism’ which through
historical usage and ubiquity cannot be reasonably understood to convey government approval of religious belief.”202 And the Newdow court cited Justice
Brennan’s dissent in Lynch in which he argued the motto In God we trust is “a
form [of] ‘ceremonial deism,’ protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny
chiefly because [it has] lost through rote repetition any significant religious
content.”203 The argument that repetition eliminates any significant religious
content from the thing being repeated is curious. The Catholic Church at

200
201
202
203

PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 187–88 (first and third alterations in original) (quoting Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Due Process and Disestablishment, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1306, 1343–44 (1949)).
O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19, 20 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (second alteration in original) (citing
Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216 (citing Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 625).
Newdow, 753 F.3d at 108 (alterations in original) (citing Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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least does not believe that repetition itself diminishes religious effect.204 And
generations of school children who recited the Pledge of Allegiance at the start
of every school day might also wonder about the value of the exercise if the
Pledge lost through rote repetition any significant patriotic content.
In contrast, some writers have acknowledged the clear religious purposes
in some of these practices. Dean Jesse Choper wrote:
The placement of “In God We Trust” on coins and currency . . . seems to
have no real purpose other than a religious one. Moreover, the proclamations by almost all our Presidents of national days of Thanksgiving to “Almighty God” only seem fairly characterized as having a religious purpose. If
one takes seriously the Court’s doctrine that a religious purpose alone produces a violation of the establishment clause, these and many other longstanding practices in our society must be held invalid.205

Professor Mark Tushnet has written that some practices “plainly have religious purposes, and no good is done by pretending, as the Court came close
to doing in Lynch, that the ordinary understanding of ‘purpose’ somehow allows a holding that these practices do not have religious purposes.”206
Both writers suggested ways to avoid the wholesale invalidity of such
practices. Dean Choper noted that “the Supreme Court simply ignores its
own articulated test when it wishes to uphold a deeply engrained national
practice that clashes with this doctrine,”207 and suggested the adoption of a
rule: “Government action should be held to violate the establishment clause
if it meets two criteria: first, if its purpose is to aid religion; and second, if it
significantly endangers religious liberty in some way by coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs.”208 Presumably, even if a reviewing
court acknowledged that the placement of In God we trust on currency had a

204

205
206

207
208

Pope John Paul II, Apostolic Letter Rosarium Virginis Mariae [Rosary of the Virgin Mary] ¶ 26, October
16, 2002, https://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/2002/documents/hf_jpii_apl_20021016_rosarium-virginis-mariae.html. Pope John Paul II explained:
One thing is clear: although the repeated Hail Mary is addressed directly to Mary, it is to
Jesus that the act of love is ultimately directed, with her and through her. The repetition
is nourished by the desire to be conformed ever more completely to Christ, the true programme of the Christian life. . . . The Rosary helps us to be conformed ever more closely
to Christ until we attain true holiness.
Id.
Jesse H. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of Recent Developments, 27
WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 947 (1986).
Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 997, 1004 (1986). Tushnet cited the tension between the Lynch majority, which held
that display of a crèche in a shopping district had a secular purpose when viewed “in [its] context,”
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671, 679 (majority opinion), and Justice Blackmun, who argued that viewing the
crèche in this way “relegated [it] to the role of a neutral harbinger of the holiday season, useful for
commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning,” id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Tushnet, supra, at 1004 n.20.
Choper, supra note 205, at 947.
Id. at 948.
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religious purpose, it would not find that the practice significantly endangers
religious liberty by coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs,
and the practice would be upheld.
Professor Tushnet approached the situation differently, using a “de facto
establishment” analysis. Suggesting that reviewing courts would approve
such practices, he suggested that constitutional doctrine be rewritten to permit the result:
[I]t is unclear why the establishment clause should be interpreted to prohibit
these de facto establishments. The Court’s recent behavior confirms that,
whatever the doctrinal rubric, such practices are almost certain to be found
constitutional anyway. One might as well candidly acknowledge, in our doctrinal structure, that de facto establishments are constitutionally permissible.209

Professor Tushnet acknowledged, but did not resolve, the next question: how
to define the contours of the de facto establishment exception. One possibility, toward which he evidenced skepticism, was that “de facto establishments
have a long pedigree.”210 Another was “that the religious content of de facto
establishments, while undeniably present, is relatively slight.”211
Professor Koppelman has endorsed Tushnet’s de facto establishment
proposal:
The . . . answer is to acknowledge the bland “de facto establishment of religion”
that prevails in the United States. It is true that its religious significance is
substantially drained by its antiquity and familiarity, but Professor Mark Tushnet is right that “[t]hese practices plainly have religious purposes, and no good
is done by pretending . . . that the ordinary understanding of ‘purpose’ somehow allows a holding that the practices do not have religious purposes.”212

According to Koppelman, this exception should insulate the placement of In
God we trust on our currency from constitutional review:
The “de facto establishment” should be understood as an exception to the
Establishment Clause, confined to public rituals of long standing whose religious content is sufficiently bland. Some aspects of the de facto establishment, such as the names of cities and the placement of “In God We Trust”
on the currency, have become drained of religious significance in the minds
of many Americans.213

Curiously, for an act drained of religious significance, he also makes reference to Professor Richard Fallon’s suggestion that “the anger and resentment

209
210
211
212

213

Tushnet, supra note 206, at 1004.
Id.
Id. at 1005.
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 152–153 (second and third alterations in original) (footnotes omitted)
(first quoting MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 11 (1965); and then quoting Tushnet,
supra note 206, at 1004).
Id. at 153 (footnote omitted) (citing Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970)).

288

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:2

that judicial rejection of these practices would arouse” means “that institutional self-interest probably plays a role in insulating these practices from Establishment Clause challenge.”214
Professor Koppelman concludes: “Have I just given away the store? I do
not think so. The exception is one that in its nature cannot allow the creation
of new instances.”215 He justifies this exception in two ways. First, quoting
Hall, he makes the excuse that “ceremonial references to the Deity on coinage and the like”:
may be treated as “grandfathered” exceptions to the general prohibition
against officially composed theological statements. Present at the very foundations, few in number, fixed and invariable in form, confined in display and
utterance to a limited set of official occasions and objects, they can safely
occupy their own small, unexpandable niche in Establishment Clause doctrine. Their singular quality of being rooted in our history and their incapacity to tempt competing or complementary theological formulations by
contemporary agencies of government sufficiently cabin them in and distinguish then [sic] from new, open-form theological expressions published under the aegis of the state.216

Of course, Professor Koppelman’s justification for the de facto establishment
exception does not fit the history of the placement of In God we trust on our
currency. The practice was not “[p]resent at the very foundations.”217 The
first placement did not occur until 1864;218 the last statutory endorsement of
the practice did not occur until 2008.219 The practice has not produced violations which are “few in number.”220 In Fiscal Year 2015 alone, over twentythree billion circulating notes and coins bore the inscription In God we trust.221
The practice has not been “fixed and invariable in form.”222 Expansions of
the practice occurred in 1908,223 1955,224 and 2008.225 The practice has not
been “confined in display and utterance to a limited set of official occasions
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221

222
223
224
225

Id. at 153 (citing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 54–55 (2001)).
Id.
Id. at 153 n.242 (alteration in original) (quoting Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018, 1023 n.2 (4th
Cir. 1980)).
Id.
1896 REPORT, supra note 9.
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 623(a)(2), 121 Stat. 1844, 2018
(2007) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(F) (2012)).
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2).
In FY 2015, the United States Mint produced 16.2 billion circulating coins. Jeppson, supra note
11. In FY 2015, the Bureau of Engraving and Printing produced over seven billion regular notes.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving and Printing, supra note 11.
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2).
Act of May 18, 1908, Pub. L. No. 60-120, 35 Stat. 164.
Act of July 11, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-140, 69 Stat. 290 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 5114
(2012)) (providing that “all United States currency shall bear the inscription ‘In God We Trust’”).
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 623(a), 121 Stat. 1844, 2018 (2007)
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5112(n)(2)(F) (2012)).
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and objects.”226 The use of currency bearing In God we trust is not limited to
official occasions, or “a limited set of . . . objects” unless one considers the set
of twenty-three billion circulating notes and coins from Fiscal Year 2015 “limited.” The practice has not occupied an “unexpandable niche in Establishment Clause doctrine.”227 As noted, the practice was expanded in 1908, 1955,
and 2008. The placement of the motto on money has been used as a justification for the governmental placement of the motto in additional ways: on
stamps,228 police cars,229 and government buildings,230 for example.
226
227
228
229

230

Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2).
Id. (quoting Hall, 630 F.2d at 1023 n.2).
See 101 CONG. REC. 9448 (1955) (statement of Sen. Carlson) (offering a bill to have In God We Trust
added to newly issued postage stamps).
For example, in 2014 a Missouri sheriff had the slogan “In God We Trust” put on the bumpers of
department cars. Steve Pokin, A Miracle! Both Sides Like ‘In God We Trust’ Story, SPRINGFIELD NEWSLEADER (June 2, 2015), http://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2015/06/02/
miracle-sides-like-god-trust-story/28373773/. Several citizens complained, including Laura
Entwisle, who wrote to the local newspaper: “If taxpayer money was used, is it legal? I’m asking
because I am not of a faith that identifies with the name ‘God’ and I don’t think I’m the only one.”
Steve Pokin, Answer Man: Who Decided to Put ‘In God We Trust’ on Cars?, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER
(May 26, 2015), http://www.news-leader.com/story/news/local/ozarks/2015/05/26/answerman-decided-put-god-trust-cars/27985807/. In an online poll, the local newspaper reported that
a majority of the respondents thought the sheriff should not have put the slogan on the cars. Id.
(reporting 44% for “yes” and 56% for “no” in response to a poll asking whether “Green County
Sheriff Arnott should have put ‘In God we trust’ on deputies’ cars”). The sheriff’s response: “I’m
guessing she is offended by it. If that’s the case. I’m hoping that she does not use any of our
currency either.” Id. For additional stories of police officers placing In God we trust on their patrol
cars, see, for example, Alan Blinder & Richard Pérez-Peña, Police Agencies Defy Critics and Show ‘In
God We Trust,’ N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/us/policeagencies-defy-critics-and-show-in-god-we-trust.html?mcubz=1&_r=0 (“‘If it’s on my money and
it’s on the state flag, I can put it on a patrol car,’ said [Polk County, Georgia,] Sheriff [Johnny]
Moats . . . . ‘I don’t know why an atheist is so upset about us putting up “In God We Trust,”’ Sheriff
Moats said. ‘I’m not saying that they trust God. I’m saying that we, as the guys in this department
who put this on our cars, we trust in God. And why is that a bad thing? Even if you don’t believe,
you know God’s all about good.’”); Elahe Izadi, Why Officers Are Putting ‘In God We Trust’ Bumper
Stickers on Their Patrol Cars, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
acts-of-faith/wp/2015/08/05/why-officers-are-putting-in-god-we-trust-bumper-stickers-on-theirpatrol-cars/ (“‘I’m not hiding from the fact that it’s religious and I’m not trying to make an excuse
for the fact that it’s religious,’ [Bay County, Florida, Sheriff Frank McKeithen] said. ‘Morals and
ethics—that’s kind of what law enforcement’s supposed to be about’ . . . . McKeithen added: ‘You
don’t have to be a Christian to trust in God, because you think of all the people in this world that
bad things happen to them and at the last moment, they say, “Oh God; please God help me.”’”);
Jasmine Spencer, ‘In God We Trust’ Placed on Davidson County Sheriff’s Office Patrol Vehicles, FOX8 (Feb.
8, 2016), http://myfox8.com/2016/02/08/in-god-we-trust-on-the-back-of-davidson-county-sheriffs-office-patrol-vehicles/ (“‘It was formed on Judeo-Christian beliefs, on our money and on a lot
of places, on the courthouses and so forth,’ [Davidson County, North Carolina, Sheriff David]
Grice said. ‘It’s something we believe in.’ . . . ‘I think when you put it on the back on [sic] of that
police car it’s reminding people you know that God has been very good to our nation[,]’ [said Pastor
Mike McDaniel of Currytown Baptist Church].”).
The Thurston County, Nebraska Board of Supervisors voted 4-2 to display “In God We Trust” in
the board room of the county courthouse. Bret Hayworth, Northeast Nebraska County to Add “In God
We Trust” in Courthouse, SIOUX CITY J. (Aug. 23, 2016), http://siouxcityjournal.com/lifestyles/faith-
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For his second justification for a de facto establishment exception, Professor
Koppelman takes comfort in the fact that the Republic has survived:
The other point that can be made on behalf of “grandfathering” is that any
deviation from the norm that it tolerates cannot be very dangerous, because
the supposed dangers have not yet materialized. The current balance of power
between church and state “is not the only acceptable balance that might be
struck, but it is acceptable at this stage in history, because the earmark of an
inappropriate balance—tyranny by either church or state—is not evident.”231

One can only wonder, if the occurrence of state tyranny is the appropriate
test, whether states ought to be able to force school children to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance,232 drivers to display “Live Free or Die” on their license
plates,233 or applicants to be a notary public to profess a belief in God.234
After all, such deviations from the constitutional guarantees did not result in
a general theocratic tyranny, either.
Whether the argument is that the placement of In God we trust on currency
is not worth worrying about because it is inconsequential, because its religious
content is somehow not what it appears, or because it was otherwise rendered
constitutional under a de facto establishment analysis, the appropriate response is essentially the same. It was nicely framed by Leo Pfeffer more than
six decades ago, in response to Professor Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr.’s advocacy
of a de minimis exception. Pfeffer began his rebuttal by helping the reader remember the context in which members of disfavored religious groups view the
assertedly de minimis practice:

231
232
233
234

and-values/religion/northeast-nebraska-county-to-add-in-god-we-trust-in/article_07b60296f4d1-5117-9d58-cbb1d63916a4.html. One supervisor who voted in the minority
said displaying the motto is not good public policy, since it violates the separation of church
and state. He said religious symbols such as a Christian cross or Jewish Star of David
should not be displayed in public buildings. “It is just like having a cross on the wall. That
will lead to the interpretation . . . that all our judgments are based on what our religious
beliefs are. I don’t have problems with people who have a religious belief. But it doesn’t
belong on a county building wall.”
Id. A supervisor who voted in the majority expressed a different view: “It is on our currency . . . . I
don’t feel there is anything wrong with displaying that. It is not putting any religion down . . . I am
not trying to offend anybody.” Id. The board acted following remarks by an organizer who “is
traveling the state, encouraging county elected officials to add the religious-motivated phrase in public buildings.” Id. The president of the Pacific Justice Institute, “a conservative legal defense organization, [which] stands ready to defend any lawsuit that would be filed against the county taking that
step,” reported, “We are seeing an explosion of municipalities choosing to do this . . . .” Id.
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 153 n.242 (quoting Marci A. Hamilton, Power, the Establishment Clause,
and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L. REV. 807, 826 (1999)).
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding West Virginia law compelling flag salute and recitation of Pledge of Allegiance unconstitutional).
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (holding New Hampshire statute with such a requirement unconstitutional).
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 496 (1961) (declaring Maryland statute with this requirement
unconstitutional).
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Yet what is “trifling” or de minimis to a dominant sect may be of vital importance to a minority sect. To the Christian, Jewish concern over Christological Christmas and Easter observances in the public schools may appear
“trifling,” as it does to Professor Sutherland; but . . . to many Jews it is not
“trifling.” Protestant judges have decided that the differences between the
King James and the Douay versions of the Bible are so small as to be negligible or “trifling”; yet Catholic children have been expelled, flogged, and otherwise persecuted, and indeed lives have been lost, because to Catholics the
differences are not de minimis. Children of Jehovah’s Witnesses have suffered
persecution for refusing to engage in the “trifling” ceremonial act of saluting
the American flag; and . . . dissenting Christians were jailed for refusing to
contribute “trifling” sums to the established state churches. To an atheist all
Christianity—and indeed all religion—would be categorized de minimis.235

Pfeffer concluded his rebuttal of the de minimis rule by speaking of the nature
of the problem to which the rule would be applied:
The rule of de minimis is a rule of convenience. The monetary loss suffered by a taxpayer as the result of a slight waste of public funds may be too
insignificant to warrant invoking the judicial process to obtain redress. The
expense to government incurred in judicially determining whether a particular government expenditure of a small sum of money is legal, may so far
exceed the attacked expenditure that it is more economical to allow the unlawful expenditure to go unchallenged. But different considerations underlie
an expenditure attacked under the separation or religious liberty guaranty.
The right sought to be vindicated is a religious right, not an economic one,
and it is therefore inappropriate to measure it in economic terms. When the
Federal or state government makes any appropriation, no matter how slight,
for religious purposes, religion has come “within the cognizance of Civil
Government.” It is for that reason that Madison warned
That the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute
three pence only of his property for the support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all
cases whatsoever.236

In the next Part, we consider several reform options for our currency.
The first eliminates the problem of having a motto that fails the Lemon secular
purpose test. The second accepts the rationale that the placement of the
motto on our currency was a reference to our religious heritage and charts a
new direction for our currency that would implement that rationale in a way
that is truly respectful of the complete history and diversity of the nation on
matters religious.

235
236

PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 188 (endnotes omitted) (quoting Sutherland, supra note 200, at 1344).
Id. at 167–68 (endnotes omitted) (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE
AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS ¶ 3 (1785)).
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III. “THIS WOULD MAKE A BEAUTIFUL COIN, TO WHICH NO
POSSIBLE CITIZEN COULD OBJECT”: HARMONIZING OUR
CURRENCY WITH OUR RICH NATIONAL HERITAGE AND
CONTEMPORARY DIVERSITY ON MATTERS RELIGIOUS
The administrative and legislative historical record is quite clear that the
placement of In God we trust on our currency had a religious, not a secular,
purpose. The statutes thus fail the first part of the Lemon test and are not
constitutional.237 But even if the courts are not convinced to do a more comprehensive and thoughtful analysis and find the placement of the motto on
currency to violate the First Amendment, the practice ought to be changed
as a prudential matter because the placement is needlessly disrespectful of so
many American citizens.
The Newdow court found a secular legislative purpose in the dicta of the
Supreme Court “that the motto, and its inclusion in the design of U.S. currency is a ‘reference to our religious heritage.’”238 It seems clear from the
administrative and legislative history that the motto In God we trust has never
been such a secular celebration of our religious heritage.239 This is in part
true because the religious heritage of the nation has always been broader
than the favored Christian majority historically associated with the motto.
But at the times of the various administrative and legislative enactments we
have reviewed it was not seen as a problem because in terms of belief on
matters religious America was a very different place than it is today.240
237

238
239
240

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose . . . .”). We leave for a future discussion whether the placement of In God we trust on
currency fails the second prong of the Lemon test, that “its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . .” Id. There is an argument that by seeming to some
to confirm that this is a “Christian nation,” the placement of the motto on currency has the primary
effect of advancing religion. Certainly that was the intention of some of its proponents. See supra
notes 57–90 and accompanying text.
Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014) (first quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 676 (1984); and then citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989)).
See supra Part I.
To be clear, America was never as monolithically Christian as the legislative history of the motto In
God we trust would indicate. Beyond the range of indigenous Native American religions, other faith
traditions were brought to America with early immigrants. African slaves brought with them their
religious and faith traditions. Judith Weisenfeld, Religion in African American History, OXFORD RES.
ENCYCLOPEDIAS: AM. HIST. (Mar. 2015), http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-24 (“African traditional religions
dominated among those pressed into New World slavery . . . .”) The organized Jewish faith in
America dates to the middle of the seventeenth century. Congregation Shearith Israel in New York
City dates to 1654. 1 JACOB RADER MARCUS, EARLY AMERICAN JEWRY 24, 55 (1951). The
Muslim presence was documented a few decades later. Peter Manseau, What Happened to America’s
First Muslims?, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/petermanseau/what-happened-to-americas-first-muslims_b_6809326.html. Non-believers were present in early America. LEIGH ERIC SCHMIDT, VILLAGE ATHEISTS: HOW AMERICA’S
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One hundred fifty-six years ago, in 1861, when Reverend Mark Watkinson wrote to suggest the placement of a religious saying on our coins to “relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism,” America was an overwhelmingly
Christian nation.241 One hundred ten years ago, in 1907, when President
Theodore Roosevelt tried without success to remove the motto from our
coins, one of his congressional opponents could assert without being ridiculed
that “we are one in the recognition of a supreme and all-wise God.”242 Sixtythree years ago, in 1954, when President Dwight Eisenhower celebrated the
fact that “[f]rom this day forward, the millions of our school children will
daily proclaim in every city and town, every village and rural school house,
the dedication of our nation and our people to the Almighty,” America was
still religiously uniform enough to mute criticism of the measure.243
But in the second decade of the twenty-first century the United States has
evolved in religious terms from where we were in 1861, 1907, or 1954. We
have become a strikingly diverse society on matters of religious belief. Simply
put, in our modern society a significant number of American citizens do not
trust in the Christian God.
Today, only a minority of adult Americans identify as Protestant
Christians.244 Approximately fifty-six million of us are “unaffiliated”:

241
242
243

244

UNBELIEVERS MADE THEIR WAY IN A GODLY NATION 21 (2016) (“Certainly infidels and freethinkers constituted a distinct minority in nineteenth-century America, as do avowed atheists and
agnostics in the early twenty-first century, but the number of unbelievers was not inconsequential
then—just as it is not inconsequential now.”). But, ascertaining the number of atheists is difficult
because of the social pressure to appear religious. For example, speaking of “the social impropriety
of overt unbelief, Professor Leigh Schmidt cites the Earl of Chesterfeield’s counsel in the mid-eighteenth century: “[E]very man is the worse looked upon, and the less trusted, for being thought to
have no religion; . . . a wise Atheist (if such a thing there is) would, for his own interest, and character in this world, pretend to some religion.” Id. at 4 (quoting 1 EARL OF CHESTERFIELD, LETTERS
TO HIS SON ON THE ART OF BECOMING A MAN OF THE WORLD AND A GENTLEMAN 275–76
(Chesterfield Press, 1917)). Many Asian immigrants through the nineteenth century brought nonChristian religious beliefs. Tony Carnes, Asain American Religions, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIAS:
RELIGION (July 2017), http://religion.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-9780199340378-e-502 (noting Buddhist, Shinto, Taoist, and Confucioan elements within the Asian-American population, in additon to Christian elements). The history of
Hindus in America, at least in an organized sense, can be said to date to 1893, when Swami Vivekananda spoke to the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago. Swami Vivekananda, Addresses at
the Parliament of Religions, RAMAKRISHNA-VIVEKANANDA CTR. OF N.Y. (Sept. 11, 1893),
https://www.ramakrishna.org/chcgfull.htm.
1896 REPORT, supra note 9.
42 CONG. REC. 3387 (1908) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Statement by the President Upon Signing Bill to Include the
Words “Under God” in the Pledge to the Flag (June 14, 1954), in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, 1954, at 563 (1960).
PEW RESEARCH CTR., AMERICA’S CHANGING RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: CHRISTIANS DECLINE
SHARPLY AS SHARE OF POPULATION; UNAFFILIATED AND OTHER FAITHS CONTINUE TO GROW 4
(2015) [hereinafter 2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY], http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/up-
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atheists, agnostics, and those who identify as “nothing in particular.”245 The
unaffiliated outnumber both Catholics and mainline Protestants. 246 Some
14.5 million adult Americans identify with non-Christian faiths: 2.2 million
Muslims, 4.7 million Jews, 1.7 million Hindus, and 1.7 million Buddhists.247
The research suggests that our religious diversity is going to increase. Between 2007 and 2014 Protestant Christians lost their majority status.248 During the same period the percentages for Christians overall declined, as did
the percentages for Christian subgroups of Protestants, Catholics, evangelicals, mainline Protestants, historically black Christian groups, Orthodox
Christians, and Mormons.249 Over the same period, the percentages for
Jews, Muslims, Hindus, atheists, agnostics, and those responding “nothing in
particular” all increased.250 Looking at age cohorts251 and marriage patterns252 suggests our diversity on matters of religion will only increase.
When he suggested the inclusion of a religious motto on our coins, Reverend Watkinson asserted: “This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen could object.”253 The nation has changed in ways Reverend Watkinson could not have imagined. People are citizens who he might not have
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251
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loads/sites/11/2015/05/RLS-08-26-full-report.pdf (reporting 46.5% of adults identifying as Christian protestants). The study uses nearly 245 million as the number of adult Americans. Id. at 7 n.7.
Id. at 10. The study reports 2014 allocations of 3.1% (atheists), 4.0% (agnostics), and 15.8% (nothing in particular), for an aggregate unaffiliated score of 22.8%. Id. at 4. Using the 245 million
figure for American adults, these translate into 7.6 million atheists, 9.8 million agnostics, and 38.7
million who identified as “nothing in particular.”
Id. at 4 (reporting 20.8% of adults identifying as Catholics and 14.7% as mainline Protestants, compared to 3.1% identifying as atheists, 4.0% as agnostics, and 15.8% as “nothing in particular,” for
an unaffiliated total of 22.8%).
Id. The study uses an overall adult population of nearly 245 million, id. at 7, with 2014 allocations
of 0.9% (Muslim), 0.7% (Buddhist), and 0.7% (Hindu), id. at 4. Some 4,655,000 people, 1.9% of
the total, are identified as Jewish. Id.
Id. Protestant Christians went from 51.3% in 2007 to 46.5% in 2014, indicating that the Protestant
Christian population declined by 4.8%. Id.
Id. Within the Christian grouping, only the Jehovah’s Witness and “other Christian” categories
increased; in percenage terms: from 0.7% to 0.8% and 0.3% to 0.4% respectively. Id.
Within the non-Christian grouping, Jewish respondents increased from 1.7% to 1.9%, Muslims
from 0.4% to 0.9%, and Hindus from 0.4% to 0.7%. Id. Atheists increased from 1.6% to 3.1%,
agnostics from 2.4% to 4%, and “nothing in particular” from 12.1% to 15.8%. Id.
Id. at 11 (“One of the most important factors in the declining share of Christians and the growth of
the ‘nones’ is generational replacement. As the Millennial generation enters adulthood, its members display much lower levels of religious affiliation, including less connection with Christian
churches, than older generations. Fully 36% of young Millennials (those between the ages of 18
and 24) are religiously unaffiliated, as are 34% of older Millennials (ages 25-33). And fewer than
six-in-ten Millennials identify with any branch of Christianity, compared with seven-in-ten or more
among older generations . . . .”).
Id. at 5 (reporting that 39% of those married since 2010 are in religiously mixed marriages, compared to only 19% in 1960, and that nearly 20% of marriages since 2010 include one religiously
unaffiliated partner who married one Christian partner, compared to only 5% in 1960).
1896 REPORT, supra note 9.
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thought possible, and the inclusion of In God we trust on the nation’s currency is
fundamentally inconsistent with their beliefs on matters of religion. Of course,
there were some citizens at the time of the Rebellion who would have objected
to a Christian religious motto, had they been considered worthy to comment.
There are many more today.
So where do we go from here? There are several options. The easiest
would be to simply remove the motto In God we trust from our currency. The
problem with this straightforward course of action—ironic given the judicial
insistence that having the motto on currency fulfills a secular purpose—is
that some Christian groups would oppose the move as a defeat for their religion and a victory for the forces of “infidelity,”254 and as an invitation to
divine retribution.255 There is perhaps something to be said for avoiding if
possible the apocalyptic conflict described by one proponent at the time of
the First Omission: “Let us nail our colors to the masthead and go on to
either defeat or victory, with our banners flying and with our trust in the
living God emblazoned upon our coinage!”256
But what if the motto on our coins could be reworked to honestly fulfill
the Newdow court’s finding “that the motto, and its inclusion in the design of
U.S. currency, is a ‘reference to our religious heritage.’”257 What if we redid
our currency to honor the totality of our heritage—and our contemporary
diversity—on matters religious? It could be done.
How this might be done is suggested by the 50 State Quarters Program of
the United States Mint, which “has been hailed as the most successful coin
program in the Nation’s history.”258 The program was designed “to promote
knowledge of individual states, their history and geography, and the rich
diversity of the national heritage among the youth of the United States.”259
Through the program, over the period from 1999 through 2008 the Mint
issued fifty commemorative state quarters, each with a unique design. Almost
thirty-five billion quarters were produced with the commemorative designs.260

254
255
256
257

258
259
260

See 42 CONG. REC. 3389 (1908) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (“Let us . . . fight infidelity until it is
literally stamped out in our country.”).
See 153 CONG. REC. 23,970 (2007) (statement of Rep. Burton) (“Once you start turning your back
on the good Lord, I think you are going to reap the whirlwind . . . .”).
Elizabeth A. Reed, Letter to the Editor, Keep the Banner Flying, 30 CHRISTIAN HERALD 1125 (1907),
as reprinted in 42 CONG. REC. 513 app. A. at 515 (1908).
Newdow v. Peterson, 753 F.3d 105, 108 (2d Cir. 2014) (first quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 676 (1984); and then citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
U.S. MINT FIN. DEP’T, 50 STATE QUARTERS REPORT: 10 YEARS OF HONORING OUR NATION’S
HISTORY AND HERITAGE 1, 4.
Id. at 6; see also 50 States Commemorative Coin Program Act, Pub. L. No. 105-124, § 2(1)(B), 111
Stat. 2534, 2534 (1997).
U.S. MINT FIN. DEP’T, supra note 258, at 4.
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The program had substantial public benefits. The Mint estimated that
the state commemorative program resulted in a marginal increase in
production of 16.3 billion quarters over the ten-year program, and a
marginal increase in revenue of $4.1 billion, which was applied “to help
finance the national debt.”261 The Mint also reported that the state
commemorative program had significant education benefits: “The 50 State
Quarters Program’s benefit to the American public extended beyond
financial results by increasing knowledge of each state’s history, geography
and culture.”262 To help the nation’s teachers fulfill the educational promise
of the program, the Mint launched a special initiative:
The United States Mint created the [50 State Quarters Program] Education
Initiative to employ the popular 50 State Quarters Program as a medium to
teach children about mathematics, geography, social studies and
history. . . . As of March 2009, approximately 6.1 million 50 States Quarters
Program lesson plans were downloaded from the United States Mint H.I.P.
Pocket Change Web site.263

The Mint concluded that the 50 State Quarters “Program energized the
Agency’s efforts to provide financial and educational benefits to the American public through the Nation’s coinage, and opened the door for a new
generation of circulating commemorative coin programs.”264
Building on that energy, walking through that open door, could be a new
program of the Mint: the “American Coins Celebrating Our Religious Diversity Program” (the “ACCORD Program”). Based on the example of the 50
State Quarters Program, the ACCORD Program would be designed to
promote knowledge of individual religions and traditions of opinions and beliefs
on matters of religion, their history and geography, and the rich diversity of the
national heritage among the youth of the United States.
How would such a program work? Although the 50 State Quarters
Program demonstrated the feasibility of a coinage program involving fifty
distinct designs, the ACCORD program could be done on a more modest
scale. Looking at contemporary survey research reports of our national
makeup on matters of religious opinion and belief, a threshhold could be set
in terms of the number of individuals self-identifying with a given survey
261

262
263
264

Id. at 1 (“The United States Mint estimated it shipped 16.3 billion more coins to the [Federal Reserve Bank] than it would have in the absence of the Program. Consequently, the Agency attributes
$4.1 billion in revenue and $3.0 billion in seigniorage [revenue net production and distribution
costs] solely to the 50 State Quarters Program.”); id. at 2 (“The 50 State Quarters Program met the
financial expectations of the authorizing legislation, generating $8.6 billion in revenue and $6.3
billion in seigniorage to help finance the national debt.”); id. at 4 (“Higher revenue and seigniorage
allow the United States Mint to transfer larger sums to the Treasury General Fund, which helps
finance the national debt.”).
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
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response. Any response having numbers at or above the threshhold would
be qualified to participate in the ACCORD program. For example, using
recent findings of the Pew Research Center,265 if one set the percentage
qualification threshhold at 0.5%, a grouping would have to have almost one
and a quarter million adherents to qualify.266 Assume the issuance of thirtyfive billion quarters, the same number as in the 50 State Quarters Program,
and a per capita allocation.267 Using that threshhold, a rich diversity of
opinions and thoughts on matters of religion would be represented:
Grouping

Percentage

Number

Quarters

Protestant

46.5

113,925,000

16,726,618,705

Catholic

20.8

50,960,000

7,482,014,388

Nothing in Particular

15.8

38,710,000

5,683,453,237

Agnostic

4.0

9,800,000

1,438,848,921

Atheist

3.1

7,595,000

1,115,107,914

Jewish

1.9

4,655,000

683,453,237

Mormon

1.6

3,920,000

575,539,568

Muslim

0.9

2,205,000

323,741,007

Jehovah’s Witness

0.8

1,960,000

287,769,784

Buddhist

0.7

1,715,000

251,798,561

Hindu

0.7

1,715,000

251,798,561

Orthodox Christian

0.5

1,225,000

179,856,115

97.3

238,385,000

34,999,999,998

Total

A 0.5% threshhold would include 97.3% of adult Americans in the program,
some 238,385,000 of the estimated 245,000,000, and would not exclude any
individually identified grouping in the Pew Research study.268

265
266

267
268

See generally 2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY, supra note 244.
This calculation is based on the Pew Research Center’s estimate that in 2014 the U.S. adult population was about 245 million. Id. at 7 (estimating that the U.S. adult population grew from 227
million in 2007 to 245 million in 2014).
U.S. MINT FIN. DEP’T, supra note 258, at 1. If the coins were allocated equally among the listed
groupings, each would be allocated slightly more than 2.9 billion coins.
2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY, supra note 244, at 4. The category “Other Christian” within the
classification “Christian” accounts for 0.4% and is undefined. The category “Other world religions” within the classification “Non-Christian faiths” accounts for 0.3% and includes “Sikhs,
Baha’is, Taoists, Jains and a variety of other world religions.” The “Other faiths” within the classification “Non-Christian faiths” accounts for 1.5% and includes “Unitarians, New Age religions,
Native American religions and a number of other non-Christian faiths.” Id.
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Following the protocols of the 50 State Quarters Program, each qualified
ACCORD Program participant would be able—through selection processes
like those employed by the individual states—to adopt a design which would
then be produced by the Mint. One can only begin to imagine the interesting
diversity that the designs might reflect. For example, the 1.7 million Hindu
Americans might choose a design for their 251,798,561 quarters with
Ganesh, the God of wisdom, or Lakshmi, the Goddess of wealth and
prospertity. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, representing
almost four million Americans, might choose a design for their 575,539,568
quarters with the Angel Moroni and a quotation from The Doctrine and
Covenants: “[S]tand ye in holy places, and be not moved . . . .”269
The largest single group in the Pew study are the almost 114 million
Protestant Christians.270 One can imagine a consensus emerging that they be
represented on their 16,726,618,705 quarters by some image of the cross,
perhaps with the Protestant version of the Ten Commandments. The fiftyone million Catholics could select a drawing of the Madonna and child for
their 7,482,014,388 quarters. Given their teachings on idolatry, the almost
two million Jehovah’s Witnesses might choose a design with simply a Biblical
quotation for their 287,769,784 quarters, such as 1 Timothy 2:5: “For there
is one God, and one mediator between God and men, a man, Christ Jesus.”271
The 1.7 million Buddhists might desire a coin with an image of Buddha
and a reference to the Five Precepts for their 251,798,561 quarters. The 4.6
million adult Americans who are Jewish might choose to be represented by
the image of a menorah and an appropriate Tanakh passage for their
683,453,237 quarters. One might hope that agnostics, accounting for almost
ten million adult Americans, would be represented on their 1,438,848,921
quarters by the image of American agnostic Robert Ingersoll and the
quotation: “I do not deny. I do not know—but I do not believe.”272 The 2.2
million Muslims might be represented on their 323,741,007 quarters by a
coin reproducing the shahada: “[T]here is no god but God. Muhammad is
the messenger of God.”273
Some groupings are more difficult. How, for exemple might the almost
thirty-nine million adult Americans in the “nothing in particular” category
choose to be represented on their 5,683,453,237 quarters? With the
inscription, “Whatever”? At almost 16% of the overall adult population, they
surely could not in fairness be excluded. God alone knows how the 7.6 million
atheists would choose to be represented on their 1,115,107,914 quarters.
269
270
271
272
273

CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER DAY SAINTS, THE DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS § 87:8.
2015 PEW RESEARCH SURVEY, supra note 244, at 4.
1 Timothy 2:5 (New World Translation of the Holy Scriptures (2013 Revision)).
Ingersoll, supra note 146.
Lloyd Ridgeon, Islam, in MAJOR WORLD RELIGIONS: FROM THEIR ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT
230, 232 (Lloyd Ridgeon ed., 2003).
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Of course some groups might wish to aggregate or disaggregate. One
can imagine the agnostics, atheists, and “nothing in particular” groups trying
to negotiate an aggregation of their 56.1 million adults, 22.9 percent of the
total, for 8,237,410,072 coins. The outcome would be interesting.
More likely might be disaggregations, as components of the Protestant
Christian grouping elected to go their own way. With some thirty-six million
mainline Protestants one can imagine a disaggregation along denominational
lines; the same for the sixty-two million evangelical Protestants.
However the groupings realigned, the results would be fascinating.
Certainly one would expect significant collateral benefits to acrue from a
coinage program celebrating the nation’s diversity of opinions and beliefs on
matters of religion. Like the 50 State Quarters Program, the ACCORD
Program would prove to be financially beneficial and educationally interesting.
The 50 State Quarters Program saw American school children searching
for rare state quarters to complete fifty-state collections. Presumably the
ACCORD Program would see the next generation of school children
searcing as assiduously for that elusive Orthodox Christian or Hindu quarter,
that rare Mormon or Muslim coin.
Surely the ACCORD Program would benefit the American public by
increasing knowledge of our history and culture. One would assume that to
help the nation’s teachers fulfill the educational promise of the Program, the
Mint would launch a special initiative to employ the Program as a medium to
teach children about mathematics, religious studies, social studies, and history.
Some citizens might be initially uncomfortable with coins that contain
religious imagery and messaging from a faith tradition other than their own.
But they would surely come to understand that the drawing of Ganesh, the
Hindu God of wisdom, on the quarter in their pocket is a patriotic and
ceremonial reference with no theological impact; that the Madonna and
child on the coin they use at the car wash has no theological meaning. They
would come to see that the image of Buddha and the reference to the Five
Precepts serve only the secular ceremonial function of formalizing the
quarter they got as change at the QuickTrip. They would see the image of
the Angel Moroni on the quarter they handed to their child as a means of
fostering patriotism, the quotation from American agnostic Robert Ingersoll
as a way to express confidence in the future. Glancing at the quarter with a
quotation from the Shahada—There is no god but God. Muhammad is the messenger
of God.—would assuredly encourage in them the recognition of what is
worthy of appreciation in society. They would see these coins as merely
symbolic of the historical role of religion in our society. They would see that
the religious messaging and imagery has a secular, not a religious, purpose.
Sure they would.
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CONCLUSION
It is the choicest compliment that has ever been paid us, and the most gratifying to
our feelings. It is simple, direct, gracefully phrased; it always sounds well—In God
We Trust. I don’t believe it would sound any better if it were true. And in a
measure it is true—half the nation trusts in Him. That half has decided it.
—Mark Twain274

Our history with respect to constitutional challenges to having In God we
trust on our currency nicely illustrates Freud’s observation that “Where the
questions of religion are concerned people are guilty of every possible kind of
insincerity and intellectual misdemeanor.”275 How other than as an insincerity could one characterize the assertion that the motto “has no theological or
ritualistic impact”?276 Given the history of administrative and legislative actions concerning the placement of the motto on our currency, how could the
conclusion that they had a secular legislative purpose be other than an intellectual misdemeanor?
The problem is the lingering sense that our history on this issue, and on
a range of related issues involving the religious liberty interests of disfavored
citizens, evidences more than Freud’s insincerity and intellectual misdemeanors. The history points to a larger problem, a fundamental lack of respect
for some Americans based on their beliefs on matters of religion.
In one sense, Twain’s observation is correct. The issue of whether it is
appropriate to have In God we trust on our currency has been decided by the
dominant part of the population. After all, in 1864, 1908, 1955, and 2007,
statutes were enacted approving or expanding the placement, and on five
occasions courts have upheld the constitutionality of the practice.277 But in
another sense, Twain’s observation is perhaps premature. For some of us,
the issue of whether it is appropriate to have In God we trust on our currency
still waits for a serious, careful, and deliberate judicial analysis under the
Establishment Clause. The issue may not have been decided just yet.
How such an analysis might proceed is suggested by an older case
274

275
276
277

Mark Twain, Personal Notes of Mark Twain, in ALBERT BIGELOW PAINE, M ARK TWAIN’S
NOTEBOOK 394 (1935). In 2016, the United States Mint issued two coins honoring Mark Twain.
Mark Twain Commemorative $1 Silver Coin, U.S. MINT, https://www.usmint.gov/coins/coin-medalprograms/commemorative-coins/mark-twain-silver (last updated June 1, 2016); Mark Twain Commemorative $5 Gold Coin, U.S. MINT, https://www.usmint.gov/coins/coin-medal-programs/commemorative-coins/mark-twain-gold (last updated June 1, 2016); see also Mark Twain Commemorative
Coins, U.S. MINT, https://www.usmint.gov/learn/coin-and-medal-programs/commemorativecoins/mark-twain (last updated Nov. 3, 2016). One can but wonder what Twain’s reaction would
have been to the In God we trust inscriptions on the coins.
FREUD, supra note 126.
Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970) (citing PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 238).
See supra Parts I and II, and notes 127–132 and accompanying text.
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presenting a related question. In 1980, the Fourth Circuit heard Hall, the
challenge to North Carolina’s “Motorist’s Prayer.”278 The court found the
writing to be religious, and while it accepted that the asserted purpose of
promoting vehicular safety was secular, it observed that “the state cannot
escape the proscriptions of the Establishment Clause merely by identifying a
beneficial secular purpose.”279 Rejecting a de minimis exception as to
“relatively minor encroachments,” the Hall court quoted the Supreme Court
for the proposition that “[t]he breach of neutrality that is today a trickling
stream may all too soon become a raging torrent.”280 The court concluded:
By placing its imprimatur on the particular kind of belief embodied in any
prayer, the state necessarily offends the sensibilities not only of nonbelievers
but of devout believers among the citizenry who regard prayer “as a
necessarily private experience.” The Establishment Clause is intended to
protect our society from the threat of political division along religious lines.
As a moment’s reflection reveals, only a ruthless, absolutist application of
the principle as it relates to officially composed prayers can insure the
intended protection. No de minimis exception is tolerable.281

The Hall court recognized the impossibility of carving out a de minimis
exception: “Indeed it could be suggested with considerable support from
history that there is literally no such thing as an innocuous theological
statement, if by that is meant one incapable of exciting any significant
religious divisions within the populace.”282 The Hall court held the North
Carolina Motorist’s Prayer unconstitutional.283
How might an analysis along the lines of that in Hall be applied to the
placement of In God we trust on currency? The reviewing court could start by
agreeing with Dean Choper and Professor Tushnet that having the motto on
currency clearly has a religious, not a secular purpose. It could reject a de
minimis exception,284 quoting Hall for the proposition that “[t]he breach of
neutrality that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging

278
279
280
281

282

283
284

Hall v. Bradshaw, 630 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1020.
Id. at 1021 (alteration in original) (quoting Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
225 (1963)).
Id. (first quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 283–85; then citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622
(1971); and then citing Comm. of Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 794–
98 (1972)).
Id. at 1022. The court also observed that
[w]hile the prayer at issue might at first blush seem utterly innocuous, there are doubtless
many even within the main theological stream of the dominant religious culture of the
affected populace who are at least made uncomfortable, and perhaps are positively offended, by the sort of narrowly confined intercessory supplication for deity’s private attention that it represents.
Id. at 1022 n.1.
Id. at 1023.
Id. at 1021 (“No de minimis exception is tolerable.”).
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torrent,”285 and the conclusion that “there is literally no such thing as an
innocuous theological statement, if by that is meant one incapable of exciting
any significant religious divisions within the populace.”286 The reviewing
court could affirm the Hall declaration that “[t]he Establishment Clause is
intended to protect our society from the threat of political division along
religious lines,” adopt its conclusion that “only a ruthless, absolutist
application of the principle . . . can insure the intended protection,”287 and
declare the practice of having In God we trust on currency unconstitutional.
But we need not speculate how the Hall court would have analysed
having In God we trust on our currency. In dicta, it told us, and the statement
was a complete deviation from its Motorist’s Prayer analysis:
References to the Deity in our ceremonies and on our coinage and seals do
not violate the Establishment Clause because they merely reflect this fact of
our history [that “[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose
a Supreme Being”] and no longer have any potentially entangling
theological significance.288

What happened to the court that described de minimis exceptions as
intolerable, that advocated a ruthless, absolutist application of the
Establishment Clause to protect society from the threat of political division
along religious lines? What became of the judges who thought there is no
such thing as an innocuous theological statement? At what point did that
court become comfortable with grandfathering violations of the
Establishment Clause?
Using Pfeffer’s insight into how disfavored religious groups may see
practices the favored religious groups see as “trifling,” consider how the
dismissive statement about In God we trust from Hall might appear to an
agnostic or atheist, a Hindu or Wiccan.289 In its analysis of the Motorist’s
Prayer, the Hall court demonstrated a concern over variations of belief within

285
286
287
288

289

Id. at 1021 (alteration in original) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225).
Id. at 1022.
Id. at 1021.
Id. at 1022–23 (inner alteration in original) (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952)).
In a footnote, the court asserted:
In a very real sense they may be treated as “grandfathered” exceptions to the general prohibition against officially composed theological statements. Present at the very foundations, few in number, fixed and invariable in form, confined in display and utterance to a
limited set of official occasions and objects, they can safely occupy their own small, unexpandable niche in Establishment Clause doctrine. Their singular quality of being rooted
in our history and their incapacity to tempt competing or complementary theological formulations by contemporary agencies of government sufficiently cabin them in and distinguish them from new, open-form theological expressions published under the aegis of the
state.
Id. at 1023 n.2.
PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 188 (“[W]hat is ‘trifling’ or de minimis to a dominant sect may be of vital
importance to a minority sect.”).
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the “dominant religious culture.”290 But in its dicta about the motto, the Hall
court evidenced no concern over variations of religious belief between citizens
disfavored and favored on religious grounds. By quoting a saccharine and
ahistorical “fact of our history”—“that ‘[w]e are a religious people whose
institutions presuppose a Supreme Being’”—the Hall court ignored the
Establishment Clause and demeaned those disfavored on the basis of their
religious beliefs.291 And when it declared that statements such as In God we
trust “no longer have any potentially entangling theological significance,” it
apparently presumed to instruct the disfavored among us on what they could
think theologically significant.292 The Hall court dicta would have denied
those outside the favored religious culture the same status and respect it
accorded those within it.
The same dismissive and disrespectful treatment is found in the de minimis,
ceremonial deism, and de facto establishment analyses. The notion that a de
minimis exception is justified because the number of instances of favorable
governmental recognition of religion “is so great and they are so pervasive that
they go unnoticed until attention is drawn to them” is clearly drawn from the
perspective of those with favored religious beliefs.293 It seems reasonable to
imagine that violations of the Establishment Clause that are so common as to
be invisible to the favored may be especially apparent and hurtful to the
disfavored. Similarly, a disfavored citizen might be expected to view differently
than a favored citizen whether it is reasonable to view as conveying
governmental approval of religious belief an Establishment Clause violation
that is broadly committed and has a long history, the kind that some analysts
would excuse as ceremonial deism.294 A disfavored citizen might also be
expected to view differently practices that would otherwise violate the
Establishment Clause but which the de facto establishment analysis assures us
are “relatively slight,”295 or “bland.”296 The observation that “[s]ome aspects
of the de facto establishment, such as the . . . placement of ‘In God We Trust’
on the currency, have become drained of religious significance in the minds of
many Americans”297 simply suggests that for other Americans—those disfavored
290

291
292
293
294

295
296
297

Hall, 630 F.2d at 1022 n.1 (“While the prayer at issue might at first blush seem utterly innocuous,
there are doubtless many even within the main theological stream of the dominant religious culture
of the affected populace who are at least made uncomfortable, and perhaps are positively offended,
by the sort of narrowly confined intercessory supplication for deity’s private attention that it represents.”).
Id. at 1022–23 (alteration in original) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313).
Id. at 1023.
PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 187 (quoting Sutherland, supra note 200, at 1343).
Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)) (noting
“historical usage and ubiquity”).
Tushnet, supra note 206, at 1005.
Koppelman, supra note 152, at 152.
Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
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on the basis of religious belief—the challenged practices have not become
drained of religious significance.
Beyond Freud’s insincerities and intellectual misdemeanors, the serious
problem with having In God we trust on our currency, and the unserious, careless, and cursory judicial analysis it has been given, is the disrespect it evidences
toward the sincerely held beliefs on matters of religion of some of our fellow
citizens, and thus by extension disrespect toward the citizens themselves.
Of course, the placement of In God we trust on our currency is just one
example of a larger pattern of statutes, rules, and governmental actions that
evidence disrespect towards citizens with disfavored religious beliefs. A few
examples help to remind us that these are not only theoretical problems.
“In the winter of 2014, Rawda Musaitef was involved in a custody dispute
with her former husband . . . in a Philadelphia family court.”298 When called
to testify, Rawda, a Muslim, requested to be sworn using a Quran instead of
a Bible. Her request was refused299 because the Pennsylvania statute provides that: “Every witness, before giving any testimony shall take an oath in
the usual or common form, by laying the hand upon an open copy of the
Holy Bible . . . .”300
In the fall of 2009, Cecil Bothwell, an atheist, was running to be a member
of the Asheville city council.301 His candidacy was challenged by H.K. Edgerton, citing a provision of the North Carolina constitution which bars from
office “any person who shall deny the being of Almighty God.”302 Bothwell

298
299
300

301

302

Allan W. Vestal, Fixing Witness Oaths: Shall We Retire the Rewarder of Truth and Avenger of Falsehood?, 27
U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 453 (2016).
Id. at 456.
Id. at 454 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(a) (1978)). Pennsylvania does allow an alternative
method to take a religious oath: “or by lifting up the right hand and pronouncing or assenting to
the following words: ‘I, A. B., do swear by Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts, that I will
____________________, and that as I shall answer to God at the last great day.’” Id. (quoting 42
PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(a)). Presumably Rawda Musaitef had the same objections to a religious
oath swearing to the Christian God. Pennsylvania also provides for a non-religious affirmation, id.
(citing 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5901(b)), which was available to Rawda Musaitef but which evidently
she deemed an inadequate substitute for a religious oath administered using the Quran, the book
of her faith tradition.
Allan W. Vestal, The Lingering Bigotry of State Constitution Religious Tests, 15 U. M D. L.J. RACE, RELIG.,
GENDER & CLASS 55, 58–59 (2015) [hereinafter Vestal, Lingering Bigotry]; see also David Zucchino,
Councilman Under Fire for Atheism, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/20/nation/la-na-hometown-asheville20-2009dec20 (reporting others
describing Bothwell as an “atheist,” a “post-theist,” “Satan’s helper,” and a “radical extremist”).
Vestal, Lingering Bigotry, supra note 301, at 58 (quoting N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 8). Today, eight
states—Arkansas, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas—have religious tests for public office; provisions which are, of course, unconstitutional. Id. at 62.
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refused to drop out of the race. He won his election and sits on the Asheville
city council today.303
In the summer of 2014, an unidentified Air Force Technical Sergeant
wanted to reenlist.304 A non-believer, he struck the words “so help me God”
from the official reenlistment form. The Air Force refused to let him reenlist
without assenting to the religious oath.305 The Technical Sergeant challenged the Air Force’s position, and amid public controversy, the government backed down.306
In the winter of 2006, the first Muslim elected to Congress, Keith Ellison
of Minnesota’s Fifth Congressional District, was the focus of controversy
when he announced that he would take the symbolic oath of office using a
Quran rather than a Bible.307 One prominent political commentator said
that the new Representative should be required to take the oath on the Bible
because to allow him to be sworn on the Quran would do “more damage to
the unity of America and to the value system that has formed this country
than the terrorists of 9-11.”308 Congressman Ellison elected to do the ceremony holding a Quran that had been owned by Thomas Jefferson “because
it showed that a visionary like Jefferson believed that wisdom could be
gleaned from many sources.”309
Viewed in one way, these cases are not as extreme as they might be.
Rawda Musaitef was not being told she could not testify, or even that she had
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Meet City Council, CITY OF ASHEVILLE, http://www.ashevillenc.gov/council/meet_city_coun
cil.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2017). Recently, however, Bothwell narrowly lost in the primary,
finishing in seventh where a sixth-place finish was required to advance to the general election. Matt
Bush, Asheville Primary Results—Bothwell Ousted, Other Incumbents Advance, BLUE RIDGE PUB. RADIO
(Oct. 10, 2017), http://bpr.org/post/asheville-primary-results-bothwell-ousted-other-incumbentsadvance.
Vestal, Lingering Bigotry, supra note 301, at 95–96.
Id. at 96 (“The airman was told his only options were to sign the religious oath section of the contract
without adjustment and recite an oath concluding with ‘so help me God,’ or leave the Air
Force . . . .” (alteration in original) (quoting Stephen Losey, Group: Airman Denied Reenlistment for Refusing to Say ‘So Help Me God,’ AIR FORCE TIMES (Sept. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://www.airforcetimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2014/09/04/group-airman-denied-reenlistment-for-refusing-to-say-so-help-me-god/)).
Id. at 96–97. The Air Force rule was clearly unconstitutional, given the Article VI § 3 provision
that “no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States.”
Allan W. Vestal, Regarding Oaths of Office, 37 PACE L. REV. 292, 292 (2016).
Id. at 293 (quoting Dennis Prager, America, Not Keith Ellison, Decides What Book a Congressman Takes His
Oath on, TOWNHALL (Nov. 28, 2006, 12:01 AM), https://townhall.com/columnists/dennisprager/2006/11/28/america,-not-keith-ellison,-decides-what-book-a-congressman-takes-his-oath
-on-n792991).
Id. (quoting Frederic J. Frommer, Ellison Uses Thomas Jefferson’s Quran, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2007,
7:32 AM)).
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to swear a Christian oath in order to testify.310 She could have testified using
a non-religious affirmation. But to use a religious oath, she would have had
to use a Christian oath. Cecil Bothwell was not being told he could not live
in Asheville, merely that to serve as an elected official of his hometown he
had to be a Christian. The unidentified Technical Sergeant was not being
told he could not serve in the Air Force, only that to do so he had to swear
an oath contrary to his religious beliefs. Congressman Ellison was not being
told he could not serve in Congress, merely that to do so he ought to swear
his oath of office on the Bible, a religious text outside his faith tradition.
In each case, the member of the disfavored religious group was being tolerated but not respected. And toleration is the wrong concept when all are
equally free. Baptist abolitionist and religious liberty advocate John Leland
framed the argument in 1790: “[T]he very idea of toleration is despicable; it
supposes that some have a pre-eminence above the rest, to grant indulgence;
whereas, all should be equally free, Jews, Turks, Pagans and Christians.”311
Toleration is the wrong concept when dealing with citizens who are free to
profess as they wish on matters of religious belief; as Andrew Dunlap argued
in 1834 when defending Abner Kneeland: “This is the boasted land of
toleration. No, gentlemen, that is not the proper word, for who shall presume
to tolerate another, when the latter has an undeniable right to enjoy and
maintain his own opinions?”312
At a time when our nation is tense with the cross-cutting cleavages of
modernity, when America is evolving toward a strikingly diverse future on
matters of religion, we would be well to remember that fidelity to the
constitutional guarantee of religious liberty requires more than toleration—
it reqires genuine respect for fellow citizens whose religious beliefs differ from
our own. If we are to be a nation that is enhanced, and not fractured, by our
religious diversity, then we must truly respect one another on matters of
religion. It will not be enough that the government stops disfavoring some
citizens on the basis of their religious beliefs—each of us must be respectful
in our own hearts—but that the government do so is a necessary predicate.
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311

312

Although there was a time when she could have been excluded from testifying because of her religious beliefs. Vestal, Lingering Bigotry, supra note 301, at 71. Remarkably, even today, two states—
Arkansas and Maryland—have religious tests for testimonial competency; provisions which are, of
course, unconstitutional. Id. at 71 & app. C.
DICKSON D. BRUCE , JR., EARNESTLY CONTENDING: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND PLURALISM IN
ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 124 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting John Leland, The Excess of Civil
Power Exploded, in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, INCLUDING SOME EVENTS
IN HIS LIFE 117, 118 (L. F. Greene ed., Arno Press, Inc., reprt. ed. 1969)) (1845)
ANDREW DUNLAP, A SPEECH DELIVERED BEFORE THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF
BOSTON IN DEFENSE OF ABNER KNEELAND ON AN INDICTMENT FOR BLASPHEMY 17 (1834).
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When Reverend Watkinson wrote Treasury Secretary Chase during the
Rebellion to propose adding “the recognition of the Almighty God in some form
on our coins,” he made a specific proposal for how the coins should be altered:
What I propose is that instead of the goddess of liberty we shall have next
inside the 13 stars a ring inscribed with the words “perpetual union;” within
the ring the all-seeing eye, crowned with a halo; beneath this eye the
American flag, bearing in its fields stars equal to the number of the States
united; in the folds of the bars the words “God, liberty, law.”313

It is ironic that Reverend Watkinson wanted to banish the Goddess of
Liberty to make room for recognition of the Christian God. Surely the time
has come to remove the motto and recognize on our currency that the religious
liberty interests of all our citizens have a claim prior to that of any religion.

313

1896 REPORT, supra note 9, at 260.
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APPENDIX A.
NOVEMBER 13, 1861 LETTER FROM REVEREND MARK R. WATKINSON
TO TREASURY SECRETARY SALMON P. CHASE.314
RIDLEYVILLE, PA., November 13, 1861.
DEAR SIR: You are about to submit your annual report to the Congress
respecting the affairs of the national finances.
One fact touching our currency has hitherto been seriously overlooked.
I mean the recognition of the Almighty God in some form on our coins.
You are probably a Christian. What if our Republic were now shattered
beyond reconstruction? Would not the antiquaries of succeeding centuries
rightly reason from our past that we were a heathen nation? What I propose
is that instead of the goddess of liberty we shall have next inside the 13 stars
a ring inscribed with the words “perpetual union;” within the ring the allseeing eye, crowned with a halo; beneath this eye the American flag, bearing
in its field stars equal to the number of the States united; in the folds of the
bars the words “God, liberty, law.”
This would make a beautiful coin, to which no possible citizen could object. This would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism. This would
place us openly under the Divine protection we have personally claimed.
From my heart I have felt our national shame in disowning God as not the
least of our present national disasters.
To you first I address a subject that must be agitated.
M.R. WATKINSON,
Minister of the Gospel.
Hon. S. P. Chase,
Secretary of the Treasury

314

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON
THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R. DOC. NO. 54-8, at 260 (1897); History of
“In God We Trust,” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/education/pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx.
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APPENDIX B.
NOVEMBER 20, 1861 LETTER FROM TREASURY SECRETARY SALMON P.
CHASE TO JAMES POLLOCK, DIRECTOR OF THE MINT.315
TREASURY DEPARTMENT, November 20, 1861.
DEAR SIR: No nation can be strong except in the strength of God, or safe
except in His defense. The trust of our people in God should be declared on
our national coins.
You will cause a device to be prepared without unnecessary delay with a
motto expressing in the fewest and tersest words possible this national recognition.
Yours, truly,
S. P. CHASE.
James Pollock, Esq.,
Director of the Mint, Philadelphia, Pa.

315

U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ON
THE STATE OF THE FINANCES FOR THE YEAR 1896, H.R. DOC. NO. 54-8, at 261 (1897); History of
“In God We Trust,” U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/about/education/pages/in-god-we-trust.aspx.
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APPENDIX C.
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT THEODORE ROOSEVELT.316
When the question of the new coinage came up we looked into the law
and found there was no warrant therein for putting “In God We Trust” on
the coins. As the custom, although without legal warrant, had grown up,
however, I might have felt at liberty to keep the inscription had I approved
of its being on the coinage. But as I did not approve of it I did not direct that
it should again be put on. Of course the matter of the law is absolutely in the
hands of Congress, and any direction of the Congress in the matter will be
immediately obeyed. At present, as I have said, there is no warrant in law
for the inscription.
My own feeling in the matter is due to my very firm conviction that to
put such a motto on coins, or to use it in any kindred manner, not only does
no good, but does positive harm, and is in effect irreverence, which comes
dangerously close to sacrilege. A beautiful and solemn sentence such as the
one in question should be treated and uttered only with that fine reverence
which necessarily implies a certain exaltation of spirit.
Any use which tends to cheapen it, and, above all, any use which tends to
secure its being treated in a spirit of levity, is from every standpoint profoundly
to be regretted. It is a motto which is, indeed, well to have inscribed on our
great National monuments, in our temples of justice, in our legislative halls,
and in buildings such as those at West Point and Annapolis – in short, wherever
it will tend to arouse and inspire a lofty emotion in those who look thereon.
But it seems to me eminently unwise to cheapen such a motto by use on
coins, just as it would be to cheapen it by use on postage stamps or in advertisements. As regards its use on the coinage, we have actual experience by
which to go. In all my life I have never heard any human being speak reverently of this motto on the coins or show any signs of its having appealed to
any high emotion in him, but I have literally, hundreds of times heard it used
as an occasion of an incitement to the sneering ridicule which is, above all
things, undesirable that so beautiful and exalted a phrase should excite.
For example, throughout the long contest extending over several decades
on the free coinage question, the existence of this motto on the coins was a
constant source of jest and ridicule, and this was unavoidable. Every one
must remember the innumerable cartoons and articles based on phrases like
“In God we trust for the 8 cents,” “In God we trust for the short weight,” “In
God we trust for the 37 cents we do not pay,” and so forth and so forth.

316

Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust’: President Says Such a Motto on Coin Is Irreverence, Close to Sacrilege, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1907, at 1, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=9406E2D8103EE033A25757C1A9679D946697D6CF.
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Surely, I am well within bounds when I say that a use of the phrase which
invites constant levity of this type is most undesirable. If Congress alters the
law and directs me to replace on the coins the sentence in question, the direction will be immediately put into effect, but I very earnestly trust that the
religious sentiment of the country, the spirit of reverence in the country, will
prevent any such action being taken.
Theodore Roosevelt
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